Cutting Edge Training

The April 15, 2013 bombing attack by Muslim Americans who were born in Chechnya has graphically awakened many Americans to the reality that most people in the world face:  terrorist bombs can suddenly shred their peace of mind anytime, any place.  In actuality, the US has been subject to terror attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) since at least May 4, 1886, when anarchists threw a bomb into a crowd at a labor rally at Haymarket Square in Chicago, killing seven police officers (officers firing into the crowd killed another four people).  In the 1970s, the US suffered 50-60 bombings per year, all of them politically inspired.¹   Terrorists have operated since ancient history, and will continue to operate as long as one person or people believe they cannot defeat a larger, stronger enemy in confrontational warfare.  Terrorism is the tool of the weak and the motivated.

The terror-suspects in the Boston Marathon bombing are American citizens who were born in Chechnya.  Rather than the predicted al Qaeda “sleeper cells” so many of us expected, these two brothers represent what is becoming the norm, the independent operator with only loose or no ties to a greater jihadi network.  According to Brian Jenkins, senior advisor to the president of the RAND Corporation, those involved in attempted and completed terror attacks are men for whom Islam is less important than the search for adventure and a desire to be part of (the) ‘epic struggle’”² of Islam against Christianity and the West.

Based on Mr. Jenkins’ research, there have been 41 Salafist-inspired² plots involving 204 people since the 9/11 attacks in 2001.  The suspects tend to be “malleable males” averaging 32 years of age (with a median age of 27) who tend to be “loners.”  74% are US citizens, 49% are US born, and one-quarter were born with non-Muslim names, suggesting they converted to Islam prior to the plots.  Contrary to public expectations, most of these individuals are not of Arab descent—they are instead predominantly Somalis and Pakastanis.⁴  The Boston Marathon bombers fit this profile exactly:  Chechyn-born US citizens of Muslim faith, 26 and 19 year old (respectively) males who had little interaction and identification with American culture and society, and who posted Salafist messages and goals on their social websites.

These grassroots actors⁵ are individuals who have a romantic—and clearly earnest—belief in Islam’s historic struggle against the West—yet are not formally affiliated with any known group.  Rather than highly trained operatives with extensive combat experience, they are principally self-trained through the internet, and influenced by e-publications such as “Inspire.”⁶   This publication, with its sophisticated graphics, was the brainchild of US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, a Salafist militant who was killed by a drone strike on 9/30/2011.  This e-magazine sought to mobilize unsophisticated US citizens to commit low-technology terror attacks with high public impact.  The Fort Hood shooting (encouraged and celebrated by al-Awlaki), killing 13 and wounding 32 people was just such an attack that urged a simple plan rather than a complex plot.  The Boston Marathon might have had similar or even greater numbers had the suspects employed firearms rather than bombs.

The tools they employ, whether firearms, poison (e.g., ricin or anthrax), or IEDs are simply the mechanism of their acts of terror.  Terrorist looks for soft targets that are easy to access and give them the highest body count for the least cost to them.  Bombs make better sense, as pointed out in the “Inspire” magazine, because it does not lead to confrontation and permits the Salafist to continue his personal warfare on the unbelievers.  With the success of the Marathon bombers, it is likely that we will be subject to more of these attacks.  Learning how to minimize the chance of being one of the victims of terrorism simply makes sense. 

Change your thinking

The American public has grown complacent and unthinking about the threat of terror—primarily due to law enforcement’s success in disrupting these plots since 9/11, as well as the Main Stream Media’s suppression of news events that might cast Islam in a negative light.  The threat remains, and may, in fact, now be greater due to the success of the attack and the “blaze of glory” in which the first brother,⁷ was killed.  While terror attacks have continued since 2001, this is the first time that one event has penetrated the national consciousness to this extent since the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.  This is likely due to the unpredictability of the attack and the targeting of a non-political, non-military event.

It’s time to change your individual mindset and take better control of your vulnerability to attack.  Whether it is an Active Shooter suspect, a Salafist suspect, an Occupy Movement extremist, a union thug, an anarchist, someone advocating violent change from the Left or the Right, it is unsafe to consider a terror attack as unlikely.  It is common place in many parts of the civilized world—and routine in less civilized countries—and we are now experiencing this same assault on our way of life and culture in a very public manner.  Beneficially, the more highly aware you become (without paranoia, which serves no one’s highest good), the less you will be susceptible to common criminal assault and robbery.

A change in thinking creates a change in actions and behavior.  Far from “bowing to terror,” this change represents a realistic response to a realistic threat.  While the likelihood of any individual being harmed by a terrorist attack (of the hundreds of thousands at the Boston Marathon, fewer than 1% were directly harmed by the blasts), it might be safe to say that 100% of those present and nearly all Americans were emotionally affected to some varying degree.  Knowing that one is statistically unlikely to be shot or disintegrated by a terrorist’s bomb does not mean it is time to sink back into the denial.  Rather, it is an opportunity to recognize that we as a society might take responsibility for our own safety as well as watching each other’s backs.

Essentially, a change in thinking creates a more tactical lifestyle, one where the blinders are lifted a bit.  Instead of walking through life with your iPod’s ear buds plugged in, your eyes down, and your mind a million miles away from your present circumstances, a habit of observing others’ behavior is created.  The upshot is that we all will make more eye contact with others, possibly facilitating more connection.  And you might make the difference between a foiled or successful plot.

Notice everyone

Creating habits of increased situational awareness is the goal.  While noticing everyone may not be possible, the goal is to maintain an “eyes-open” approach to being in public.  Who and what is around you?  Reportedly, one of the victims in the Marathon bombing (a double amputee) made eye contact with the bomber as he put his backpack with the IED down and walked away.  This is an example of the need for increased situational awareness.  Asking, “Why is this guy leaving his backpack on the sidewalk in the middle of a crowd?” may have saved this man’s legs and the lives of others.   This is a question he may be asking himself for the rest of his life.⁸  Rather than a criticism of him, this is something any of us might have done.  Instead, let’s change our timing and ask these questions pre-event—and then act upon the answers.  For example, the average time an unattended bag or package is reported in Israel is less than 40 seconds.  Israelis have learned the hard way to pay attention to potential threats.

Situational awareness is not about racial profiling.  Racial profiling is ineffective and does not further the goal of creating situational awareness.  Because any individual is ethnically a member of “X” race tells us nothing about his or her beliefs, intentions, or threat level.  An “Arab,” “Somali,” “Pakastani,” or even the fact that one is Muslim is not an indicator of threat.  While a suspect description of an individual of “X” ethnicity for a specific crime creates the need to critically examine others of that ethnicity, there is no jihadist “race.”  Extremely devout Muslims may wear a skullcap and their women wear hijabs (head scarf) and even burkas (a loose garment covering all of the body, including the face, leaving only the hands uncovered).  That they may be sympathetic to jihadist ideals and goals does not necessarily make them a terror threat.  Terrorists, both Salafist and secular, and Active Shooters as well, come in every ethnicity and country, including our own.

Effective observation notes the differences in behavior and affect from “normal” social conduct.  Affect defined as the outwardly observable appearance of an individual indicating mood or psychological demeanor.  We see other people moving through their days, some in good moods, many not.  Our brains are hardwired to recognize anger, threat, and fear in others.  We first need to observe their affect before we can recognize it for what it might be.  How is this person’s behavior or demeanor different from those around him or her?

Some observations that lead to questions about an individual and their potential threat level:

• Whose affect is different from the rest of the crowd?  He or she may just be having a bad day.  Or it might be his/her last day.  Suicide bombers have been noted to have a range of affect from beatific to mournfully crying.  Active shooters have ranged from arrogant to euphoric.
• Is he or she hyper-vigilant?  Is this person in a state of intense “startle reaction,” appearing wide-eyed or giving the impression he or she is about to be caught doing something wrong?
• With this difference in affect from those around him/her, is there a disconnect between that person’s dress and everyone else’s?  The well-used example is wearing an overcoat on a warm day.
• Is he or she carrying a backpack or duffel?  These objects are so common in our culture that they are unnoticed except by loss-control security personnel in retail stores.  The presence of a backpack is unexceptional except when coupled with unusual behavior or affect. 
• Why is that property abandoned?  Observation of abandoned property is useless without the willingness to take action.  While a person leaving a bag or package in a public place may be absent-minded or careless with their property, that person may later count on someone perhaps noticing and reporting the package or bag to prevent its theft.  If you discover abandoned property  in an area where people are expected or are gathering, first gain distance from the bag, and then report it to police or security.  If possible, it is best to report it while behind cover, out of the path of the blast effects (overpressure, heat, and shrapnel).  Do not investigate the package unless you have the training to do so.
• Is his/her chest/waist weirdly bulky for the overall body size—are the legs/arms to torso consistent or inconsistent with normal proportions?  Someone who is strangely bulky might be wearing an explosive vest.  Strangely, some suicide bombers have had wires hanging out of their clothing (this has been seen several times in Israel and helped to save countless people).  Does this person have a rifle or shotgun barrel extending below his jacket?

Remember:  observation of behavior and affect that is out of the ordinary is the goal of situational awareness.  The early warning and ability to report in sufficient time to permit law enforcement to intervene and evacuate the blast area is key to preventing multiple injuries and deaths should it be the real deal.  At worst, someone’s abandoned or forgotten property is recovered by authorities and will not be stolen. 

Be legally armed

While legally carrying a handgun will do nothing to prevent a terrorist bombing, armed individuals can positively influence and sometimes end an Active Shooter event.  According to Ron Borsch, of those events that are interrupted or stopped by someone other than the suspect, armed civilians shoot the suspect twice as often as responding police officers.  Nothing is able to confront an armed bad man as efficiently and effectively as an armed good man or woman.

Unlike terrorists, active shooter spree shooting perpetrators (as opposed to workplace shooters who then might take hostages or attempt to flee) tend to be shallow, emotionally frail individuals who are not willing to fight with a capable adversary, and they tend to fold immediately.  90% of spree shooters (those who attempt to murder as many unarmed strangers as possible in the shortest possible time) commit suicide at the first sign of resistance.  For example, in the December, 2012, mass shooting in the Clackamas County Mall (Oregon), the suspect immediately committed suicide when a man with a concealed weapon permit pointed his handgun at him.

Your tactics will include finding a corner to fight from, and firing at the shooter at the earliest possible moment.  Even if he is too far for you to effectively hit, firing at him will let him know that he is not the only one with a gun in the location.  If you cannot fire directly at him for fear of hitting innocents behind or around him, fire into a wall near him, or even the ceiling above him.  Statistically, this tends to end the event.  If he begins to target you, this has two benefits:  1) he’s no longer murdering the unarmed innocents, giving the police more time to effectively respond; and 2) you’re fighting from a corner and he has to hit a small target.

Also, be prepared to be met by anxious, fearful police officers.  Do what they tell you to do immediately.  Realize that they don’t know you are the “good guy,” and they want to make it out of this situation alive as well.

Have a plan

While one would ideally avoid crowds during terrorist times, it is not practical.  This threat is with us for the duration of Islam versus the West, and there is no way to avoid crowds in shopping for food, celebrations, watching a game—your child’s or the pros—or watching the end of a marathon.  Whether an attack by terrorists consists of one or more IEDs as seen in Boston, or it is a direct assault with firearms, having an idea of what you might do should something happen will be vital.  Additionally, knowing areas to avoid can create a safer situation.

Active Shooters, like terrorists and criminals in general, love “gun-free zones.”  If you are in one of these high-danger zones, make sure your situational awareness is in over-drive.  The early observation of unusual affect and threat behavior is essential to increasing your safety from all types of threat.

With family members, planning is key to increasing everyone’s safety.  My wife and I have an explicit agreement if something happens and we are with our grandchildren:

• If we can get out as a family, we move immediately away from the threat.
• If the family is threatened, she takes the grandchildren as I address the threat.
• If we are without the grandchildren, we play it by ear.

With this planning explicitly agreed upon, there are fewer decisions, which means less time is spent in neutral while the events play out around us.  Having a plan permits quick modification rather than figuring something out in the middle of someone shooting at you, in the midst of an explosion, or criminal assault.

Conclusion

Americans are joining the rest of the world in being forced to have an awareness of vulnerability to a threat.  While “gun-free zones” assist Active Shooters in their targeting and execution of their mass murders, terrorists strike soft targets where maximum infliction of severe injury is possible for the least amount of effort.  We will never be able to prevent individuals and groups who believe their grievances justify the murder of anonymous innocents.  Even in a police state like Russia (even when it was the Soviet Union) and China there are still terrorist attacks and mass casualties. 

We can, however, make it more difficult for the terrorist and Active Shooter suspects to operate.  Early observation and reporting, as well as avoidance of items typically used to transport or hold IEDs can make a difference.  Legally carrying a handgun (and being able to use it) will stop an Active Shooter, or, at least, slow him down.

It’s time to pay attention and change how we do business as a people to make us safer while preserving the freedom we cherish.  As our good friend Gordon Graham says, “If it’s predictable, it’s preventable.”  It is predictable that we will remain the target of terror attacks.  While law enforcement may not be able to prevent or interdict every terrorist act, we as individuals and a society are able to better observe and act to upon the indicators of threats to protect ourselves and others from the results of these attacks.

__________________________

1.     “A Desire To Be Part Of An 'Epic Struggle' -- A New Profile Of Jihadis” by Judith Miller, 4/19/2013, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/04/18/stray-dogs-not-lone-wolves-new-profile-jihadis/

2.     Ibid.

3.     “Salafism”’ is a militant segment of Sunni Islam.  Salafists believe only they are the correct interpreters of Islam and the teachings of the Qu’ran.  In their view, all non-Salafists Muslims are infidels who must be converted, and the entire world will someday be dominated by their fundamentalist beliefs.  The Wahabi tribe’s strict interpretation of living one’s life only through the Qu’ran and the Hadith Qudsi (Sacred Hadith, a recording of the sayings and actions of Muhammad) are the basis of the militant Salafist movement.

4.     Op.cit.

5.     Stratfor Global Intelligence, “Boston Bombing Suspects: Grassroots Militants from Chechnya,” http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/boston-bombing-suspects-grassroots-militants-chechnya?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_freereport=20130419&utm_term=BostonBombing&utm_content=readmore&elq=cdc5af94fc4c40248dc1f54d62a83e6d

6.     http://publicintelligence.net/aqap-inspire-issue-10/

7.     Please note, Cutting Edge Training never refers to terror and active shooter suspects by name.  We will not participate in the process of generating copycats by glorifying these individuals.  These individuals deserve the ignominy of anonymity and being ignored by history.

8.     This is a teaching point only and not a criticism of this individual who was maimed.  I have great compassion for the victims of this attack and their families and loved ones.  We must learn from events such as these to help mitigate these senseless losses.

It’s no secret that ammunition is both expensive and scarce, negatively impacting law enforcement and civilian shooters—if there is no ammo or it breaks our budgets, there is no training.  But we still have to train, and, as instructors, train our officers.  In light of ammo problems, the question is how?  Dry-fire can be an answer, but traditional dry-fire with unloaded weapons has serious drawbacks.  Unintentional discharges are a real possibility.  Additionally, training scars occur in having to manipulate the slide following each trigger press (because when the trigger is pressed and a loud click is heard, the instant reaction should be tapping the magazine, not cycling the slide to reset the trigger).

The question remains:  how do we provide the training we need in a safe, economical, and effective manner?

The answer lies in the SIRT Laser Training Pistol by NextLevel Training (www.nextleveltraining.com).  SIRT stands for “Shot Indicating, Resetting Trigger,” and this training tool represents a giant leap forward in meaningful dry-fire training.  In the form and feel of a fully weighted Glock pistol (other common brands will soon be introduced), the trigger can be adjusted to match the weight and feel of your duty pistol’s trigger.  Depressing the trigger, there is a realistic take-up, resistance, and sear let-off.  The trigger then realistically resets, ready for the next “shot.” 

Each trigger press results in a highly visible laser dot on the target (available in a green laser for outdoors or red for primarily indoor use).  The shooter (and instructor) receives instant accuracy feedback on each trigger press regardless of whether you are target-focused or front sight-focused.  Using the SIRT Laser Training Pistol, powered by a standard CR123A battery, shooters maximize their training in trigger mechanics, grip, stance, and accuracy with a realistic weapon utilizing a realistic trigger. 

While ideal for individual training, all SIRTs have an additional built-in instructional function.  A toggle switch on the top of the non-reciprocating slide provides feedback from two lasers:  first, a laser “trigger take-up indicator” when the trigger finger takes up the slack, and the second laser shot indicator.  The take-up indicator’s laser dot is adjusted below the shooter’s line of sight, letting the instructor observe not only when the shooter contacts the trigger, but also if there is both proper sight alignment and sight picture before the shot. 

All of the fundamentals, including precise trigger mechanics, are reinforced by the instant feedback of the laser’s dot.  Trigger problems are instantly identified when the dot is off-target.  Forget diagnosing bullet hits on targets.  Incorrect trigger presses show up as “dashes” rather than “dots” on the target, requiring the shooter to focus on improving trigger manipulation, grip, and follow-through.  The direction of the dash shows the direction the shooter is pulling, pushing, heeling or otherwise moving the weapon during the shot.

There are three models offered, the “SIRT Pro,” and two “SIRT Performer” models.  The Pro model has steel construction surrounding the electronics (housed in what is normally the slide).  The Performer models are of polymer construction.  If I were spending scarce training equipment dollars, there is no question that I would go for the SIRT Pro’s solid construction and resulting capability to withstand abuse by officers. 

Far from being a toy, this is a robust training tool that will take the rigors of combatives training.  While anything can break, you’d have to work pretty hard at it with the Pro model.  In defensive tactics (only the Pro model is recommended for DT training), the green shot indication laser dot on the “suspect” provides hit feedback far better than a red shot indicating laser while the dual laser provides trigger contact feedback to instructors.  On the live-fire range, the SIRT can substitute for repetitions between live-fire (saving ammunition while getting trigger presses and accuracy feedback), as well as for safety rehearsals when moving.  In scenario training, there is no possibility of injury (the lasers are eye-safe) or damage to property, no clean up, and each trigger press is estimated to cost less than $0.0002 through the life of the $3.00 battery.

In the time I’ve taken to write this review, I’ve had instant visual feedback on no less than 40 deliberate trigger presses and over 100 rapid fire trigger presses on various targets strategically placed around my office (single targets, multiple targets, a hostage target, and targets behind simulated barricades, all at various angles, distances, and sizes).  On a normal work day, I get 150 to 300+ quality trigger presses with absolute safety because live ammo cannot be loaded into the SIRT and with no need to manipulate a slide between each shot to reset the trigger.  Gone are the days of dry-firing my “empty” duty gun at the TV (to my wife’s relief).  If this is not enough, I often get up to 50 magazine changes per day using the SIRT’s weighted magazines. 

After four decades of intensive shooting and teaching shooting, the SIRT has revealed some of my previously hard to diagnose problems (I’m evidently good at hiding bad habits, even from experienced trainers).  The laser is unrelenting in its feedback, even more so than live-fire because there is no muzzle blast, bullet, or hazard to worry about.  It is just the mechanics and the laser dot (or the dreaded dash).  There is no other explanation for the improvement of my shooting other than the time I’ve put into the SIRT.

With all of the training benefits, the rugged construction, and the miniscule cost per trigger press, there is just no argument against NextLevel Training’s SIRT Laser Training Pistol.

For a 20% discount on the SIRT Laser Training Pistol, use discount code:  CETLEM

This is one in a series of "Why Do We Teach?" articles focusing on training subjects in police academies, in-service training.  Not just police related, these concepts and methods are often commonly taught.  The series details why we either teach that concept, modify it, or reject in favor of a more practical solution.  If you teach it, it must be defensible, pragmatic, applicable to real-life combat and survival, and lawfully justifiable. 

Handgun shooting stances are taught to shooters and reinforced through hours and years of training.  Creating a stable shooting platform, from the soles of the feet through the hands, is necessary to obtain the hits on the target or, more vitally, on the Threat.  Stances are performed with the legs comfortably bent, spine with a bit of a forward lean, with the arms either pushing and pulling, creating the dynamic tension for which the Weaver Stance is known, or pushing the hands forward symmetrically to form the Isosceles Stance.  It is important to focus upon a proper stance in order to be more successful in surviving shootings, right?

Well, no, not really.  Early formal stance training may be useful to a developing shooter.  However, concentrating on perfecting a stance is generally counter to prevailing in a shooting.  Most shootings take place in extremely close distances involving very large targets, are very abrupt, and extremely violent.  Many officers find themselves in awkward positions when the gunfight begins.  Tactics are much more relevant to your survival than your stance. 

Stances May Be Counterproductive in a Gunfight

The mere mention of a “stance” automatically causes the legs to form a solid, well-balanced base supporting the upper body as it fires the weapon.  Marksmanship requires a strong foundation.  However, accuracy, and thus marksmanship, is contextual.  In most gunfights, what the legs are doing is irrelevant to marksmanship needed to survive.  Training to stand solidly in the open and trade shots with a murderous Threat is a sucker’s game—every bullet fired in your direction may end your life.  While being a static target may theoretically have the possibility of increasing your accuracy, being a stationary target definitely assists the bad guy with his marksmanship and putting bullets through you. 

Standing still with bits of red hot lead zipping past while being thumped by muzzle blast generally decreases any shooter’s accuracy potential.  The more vulnerable you perceive you are, the less physically and mentally functional you are likely to become.  Accuracy is more a factor of being able to cope with and overcome your perception of immediate personal vulnerability.  While you are not likely to instantly affect the Threat shooting you (most bullets take time to cause the body to react), you can create a sense of more time that may increase your ability to lay sufficiently accurate fire on the Threat to save your life.  The tactical responses proven to likely increase your survivability is either sudden angular movement or moving to a corner and fighting from there.  Static stances have no place in this lethal environment when you are behind the Threat in the gunfight and need to stretch time to effectively respond.

Developing the capability for precise fire is a necessary skill for any shooter.  However, precision is rarely called for in an actual shooting.  “Combat Accuracy” is all that is necessary for survival.  Paraphrasing Rob Pincus, combat accuracy can be defined as “Any round disrupting the imminent threat to life.”  This may mean a bullet strike to the brain or spine, a hit in the upper thoracic cavity, the pelvis, or any bone.  Sometimes just simple “minute of human” accuracy to any part of the body is sufficient, but no single bullet can be counted on to stop the fight.

For the balance of this discussion, let’s assume that the legs are doing their thing independent of the upper body’s efforts—this may be moving, crouching, or kneeling.  Therefore, this discussion will be about a Modified Weaver or Modified Isosceles and their contextual usefulness. 

Modified Weaver

The position of the arms in the Weaver Stance, characterized by the push-pull tension of both hands on the grip of the handgun, arguably provides a very stable platform for accurate fire.  This shooting method was popularized by Lt. Col. Jeff Cooper as the “Modern Pistol Technique,” permitting more precise shot placement at small targets at any distance.

Fundamentally, the body is bladed and the shooting elbow is locked straight, with the gun-hand pushing the handgun forward.  The support-hand’s palm contacts the shooting hand’s fingers, pulling directly back with the elbow bent and pointing downward.  Many have been taught to shoot with their shooting elbow bent and pushing forward.  This is an error.  Instructors attempting to mimic Col. Cooper’s shooting style are apparently unaware that a combat injury prevented him from extending his arm.  He taught others to straighten their gun-arms. 

The FBI’s “Violent Encounters” study (2006) revealed that more than 97% of shootings begin with the suspect shooting first.  A human’s “startle response” to surprise results in spinning to directly face the threat, hands up at face level and extended to protect the eyes and throat, with the spine forward in a semi-crouched position.  Problematically, human factors and the Weaver-hold are counter to the body’s reactions in a sudden shooting situation. 

It is a rare shooter trained in the Weaver method who does not react to sudden and unexpected gunfire by instantly moving into an Isosceles upper body (regardless of what the legs are doing).  In scenario training where there is no expectation of actual injury—with only minor pain penalties when hit by marking cartridges or Airsoft pellets possible—the sudden response to unexpected “deadly threats” by “Weaver-trained” shooters is almost invariably an Isosceles-type reactive response.  This is even seen on the range where there is no personal peril whatsoever.  Shooters tend to transition into the classic Weaver-hold apparently as they realize they are in the “wrong stance.” 

When wearing body armor, the Weaver stance also presents the non-dominant side’s arm hole to the Threat.  Because the Weaver can only be properly employed in a bladed stance, the strongest part of the body armor (center chest where the shock plate is located) is in an irrelevant position, with the unprotected armpit placed in the most vulnerable position.  Wounds from bullets traversing the body laterally through the axillary region, that is, from side-to-side through the armpit, are incredibly threatening to survival because they tend to pierce multiple organs and vital blood vessels of the upper thoracic region. 

The Weaver-hold is ideal when fighting from a corner.  With most of the body covered by the barricade, the stability of this hold is put to use making longer distance or precision hits.  Corners give you time.  Marksmanship is all about having the time to put the bullet on target. 

Modified Isosceles

The Modified Isosceles is a reactive “stance.”  The Isosceles (upper body square to the threat, hands pushed forward at eye-level, the legs doing what they do in that specific situation) reflects how humans naturally react when faced with a sudden close threat.  The upper body of the Isosceles mimics the natural startle response, as seen in video after video of officers responding to real-life threats by punching their handguns out in front of them.  It is a human instinct to put a weapon between you and the perceived threat. 

While generally not as inherently accurate at distance as the Weaver hold, it doesn’t have to be.  Combat effective accuracy requires only hits on target, preferably in most cases, with bullets impacting within three to six inches of each other, creating as much damage to multiple organs as possible.  At close distances where the Isosceles-style will likely be employed, a high degree of accuracy is generally not necessary for survival.  Hitting him well, quickly and often is more critical to winning. 

If wearing a ballistic vest, the Isosceles-hold keeps the center of your vest facing the threat, affording you maximum protection.  It also supports moving and hitting much better than its well-known counterpart. When the shooter moves in any angular or lateral direction, the Isosceles-hold supports hitting until the angles become too severe, forcing the shooter to transition to a one-hand hold. 

Not a Question of “Either/Or”

Either/or is not a question for warriors or trained professionals.  Paraphrasing Gabe Suarez, the context of the problem determines strategy; strategy determines tactics; and tactics determine the methods and skills employed to solve the problem:

• Where’s the Threat?  Either close or far, big or small.
• What’s his weapon?  Firearm, blade, or striking implement.
• What’s he doing?  Charging you or standing.  Grabbing you or behind cover.
• Where are you?  In the open, behind concealment, or behind cover?
• Are you surprised or did you have enough time to prepare?  If you had time to prepare, you are likely behind a corner with a firearm in-hand.
• Are you willing to shoot him right now or are you still frantically looking for alternatives.  Remember the old saying, “Once you’re in the fight, it is way too late to wonder if this is a good idea.”

These questions will likely not be answered so much as reacted to.  Realistically, this decision is not made as it is a reaction per your training to the situation suddenly erupting in front of you. 

Conclusion

All plans are made for flat terrain and sunny weather regardless of the ground-truth.  Having a rigid plan to engage in a gunfight with a certain weapon hold and stance is not realistic.  Training and expectations of “how it’s going to go down” may not match your immediate needs—especially so if dogma has any part in your decision-making.  Desperately clinging to a “style” or “method” may mean that you are attempting to drive a nail with a screwdriver in a life-and-death situation.  While a screwdriver is a fine and necessary tool, it cannot be applied in every situation.  The same is true of a shooting stance where dogmatic adherence to a “style” due to guru-worship or personal ego-investment may leave you confused, unable to effectively respond, and perhaps horribly injured.

If you’re suddenly attacked at close range and are purely reactive, you’re most likely to shoot (and hopefully move) in some form of a Modified Isosceles platform.  From contact to rock-throwing distances, movement is the highest initial survival priority—hitting him is a very close second.  However, if you are fighting from a corner, employing the Weaver platform is more likely to get the needed hits, especially if the Threat is at distance or behind his own cover.  Fighting from a corner creates the perception time, and if you have the time to make a precision shot, Weaver may help you obtain that hit.

The bottom line in any deadly force response is to interrupt the eye-target line with the weapon, and once the weapon is on-target, to fire repeatedly slowly enough to hit him as long as you perceive the imminent deadly threat remains.  How the body supports this is context dependent and based on the tactics you employ to survive.  The old bromide certainly applies:  “In twenty years, no one will care about which caliber or stance you were using in the gunfight.  All they’ll care about is whether or not you won the fight.”

This is one in a series of "Why Do We Teach?" articles focusing on training subjects in police academies, in-service training.  Not just police related, these concepts and methods are often commonly taught.  The series details why we either teach that concept, modify it, or reject in favor of a more practical solution.  If you teach it, it must be defensible, pragmatic, applicable to real-life combat and survival, and lawfully justifiable. 

The Punch/Draw is a technique designed to disrupt a sudden imminent threat who is within touching distance.  As you realize the suspect is reaching for a weapon, you simultaneously strike the suspect in the face or chest with your non-gun hand while drawing your weapon as you step back.  If the Threat remains within touching distance, employ a combat tuck and shoot him.  If not, extend your handgun out, interrupt the eye-target line, reference the sights and/or weapon, and shoot until the imminent deadly threat is stopped.  The strike disorients or delays his ability to shoot you while giving you time to get on target.

So it makes sense to teach this method when responding to close imminent threats, right? 

Well, no, not really as it is generally taught.  We taught this method in the 1980s before it was widely popularized, and continued until the mid-90s when force-on-force drills began to alert us to a problem—the Punch/Draw didn’t seem to work as advertised.  Then came the avalanche of in-car videos, and we began to see officers shoving or striking suspects with too little negative effect, confirming a problem with this method.

Reality is Problematic

As many as half of the officers being murdered by gunfire are from contact to three-feet away from the suspects, and suspects almost universally get the first shot off (“Violent Encounters,” FBI, 2006, page 49).  Trainers realize that officers need to even up the timelines in the shooting:  slowing or stopping the suspect from drawing while creating time for the officer to be able to shoot.  The Punch/Draw was developed in response to this perceived need. 

The strike is intended to disorient the Threat through actual injury or by distracting him sufficiently to enable the officer to draw his/her weapon.  The problem with the Punch/Draw is the nature of momentary effects of the strike (if the officer actually makes contact) and the realistic length of time it takes the officer to draw the handgun before the suspect can begin shooting.

The Punch

The “punch” is actually a quick palm-heel strike to the face, head, or body concurrent with drawing the handgun.  This strike is properly more a “stiff-arm” to the face, rocking the man’s head back or gaining distance from the suspect—either he moves back or the officer is propelled backward, gaining some distance. 

It is not unusual for any strike to the head to miss completely, or to get only partial contact.  Accuracy is important, but so is speed.  The moment you orient to his drawing a weapon, you must react.  If your hand is not instantly to his face or striking his chest upon orienting, you won’t beat his first shot. 

The expectation of the effect of the strike must be realistic.  Most punches in a fight miss.  This one just might miss as well.  If you manage to make contact, it will likely be ineffective at stopping his first shot.  He may stumble back if hit well, but that may not give you the added time you need.  It is highly unlikely to disbalance him and cause him to fall, and an instant knockout is very unlikely. 

The Draw

It is not unusual for a draw to take more than one-second from a duty holster in normal circumstances.  This means your strike must be effective enough to buy you the time you need to draw your handgun, target the Threat, and fire well enough with enough rounds to stop him from shooting you.  Failing that, you are simply in a gunfight.  Striking and pushing him back will not likely stop him from shooting.

Modifying the Punch/Draw

A modification combined with movement may be a better option in certain situations where you choose maneuver to your advantage.  The traditional straight palm-heel strike carries your bodyweight either forward into the Threat (resulting in a more effective strike) or, more likely, backward.  In either case, the linear movement keeps you anchored in front of the Threat.  A static target on his radar is a very dangerous place to be in a gunfight. 

Rather than a straight palm-heel strike to his nose, a quick lateral palm-strike has proven to be useful.  It is similar to a slapping motion and delivered horizontally to his jaw or ear in the same direction you are moving.  The strike is combined with the first step (if moving to the right, the right foot steps as the non-gun left hand strikes).  The striking surface is ideally the open-handed palm heel.  As you move you strike on the way by, draw, circling to keep to his flank or rear as you make your shoot/no-shoot decisions.  If you reasonably believe he is a deadly imminent threat, shoot him in the flank or back.

Other Options?

No one can decide pre-fight what is going to work in any given situation—which is one of the reasons techniques are a poor training choice.  Only you will be able to solve your problem.  The principles to abide by in any situation where you are in touching-proximity to a firearm are:

• Target seek and Put weapons to targets©.  If there is an open target, reasonably strike, bite, knee, shove, or shoot with his weapon or with yours.
• Move in angles and circles©.  Whether you are moving or you are physically moving him, all movement is at an angle to or from him, or in a circle.
• Body parts to body mass©.  If you touch him, that body part is welded to your body, forcing him to deal with your body weight rather than just your strength.  If you touch his weapon, it gets welded on to him or to you (paying attention to the muzzle direction at all times).
• Put the resisting suspect to the ground IMMEDIATELY!©  As soon as possible, get him to the ground—hard. This may involve takedowns or shooting until he is on the ground and no longer a threat.

Some solutions in the past to a weapon being drawn in proximity have included:

• Don’t fight over a weapon in his waistband or pocket.  If you get a hand on his handgun or over his hand holding a handgun in either his pocket or waistband, don’t fight for it—press the weapon into him and just pull the trigger (making sure your leg(s) is not in the line of fire).  It’s a deadly force situation, so employ deadly force.
• Divert the muzzle and bring the weapon to you.  Slap at in-hand weapons to divert the muzzle, then press the weapon and his gun-elbow to your body…then fight.  If a weapon is within touching distance, slap it, don’t grab.  Grabbing is muscular and slow, slapping is quick and uses the weight of your hand (average:  three pounds) to move the muzzle.  Close rapidly and pull that weapon sideways into your chest, pressing it as hard as possible.  Keep the muzzle away from your body parts and toward his.  If safe, press the trigger, hitting him or creating a malfunction (and be prepared for the muzzle blast).  Strikes can include your forehead to any part of his lower face and nose, and knee strikes to his soft lower parts (groin and thighs), setting him up for you to shoot him or take him down.  If safe, draw your weapon and shoot him (proximity shots to the femoral triangle, armpit, or supraclavicular triangle are best, as are shots to the side and rear of the head, neck, or back.
• Divert the muzzle and shove the weapon into hm.  Slap at in-hand weapons to divert the muzzle, then press the weapon into his body…then fight.  After slapping it, he may pull the handgun back toward him.  Wherever the weapon goes, you must immediately follow and divert that muzzle from you.  People are just not prepared to deal with someone shoving something into their body.  Drive into him, push that weapon against him, and press the trigger as soon as you can (and not be hit yourself—again, prepare for the muzzle blast).  Target seek, draw your weapon when it is safe, and make proximity shots safely.
• Shove the muzzle into your vest, and press the trigger.  A deputy lost his handgun to a suspect and losing the fight, grabbed the suspect’s wrist and pulled the muzzle directly into his ballistic vest, then fired the weapon.  The vest contained the bullet.  The deputy, expecting the hit, continued to fight and saved his life.  Last ditch?  Yes, but good to have in your tool box.

Conclusion

Instead of the traditionally taught Punch/Draw, we teach to strike, move and hit (with bullets).  It makes better tactical sense and is more realistic in the real world where someone is actually attempting to murder you within touching distance.  If the Threat is drawing his handgun, it makes better sense to go at him, pin the weapon against his body when it is still in the waistband or pocket, and press the trigger rather than fighting over a handgun.  If the weapon is clear of the clothing and in-hand, slapping to divert the weapon, pressing it against something while maintaining awareness of the muzzle’s direction, fighting to gain some type of advantage, and then either taking him to the ground (safer) or standing, draw your weapon and make proximity shots to less defensible targets makes sense. 

The traditional Punch-Draw technique is problematic, not serving the very real need for which it was designed.  Modifying it, striking and moving at an angle to create a distraction while maneuvering to his flanks or back, or dispensing with it altogether in favor of aggressing the suspect’s weapon and using it against him, or immobilizing it while you access your own has proven to be the way to go. 

This article was published by the International Association of Law Enforcement Firearms Instructors in their magazine, "The Firearms Instructor," Issue 54.  Please note:  revisions to this blog article have been made to reflect changes in the case law that was in force at the time of the original writing. 

Police officers have been armed with firearms almost since the inception of law enforcement in the US.  Since equipping officers with handguns, shotguns, submachineguns, and rifles, officers have pointed those weapons at suspects whom those officers believed to be a reasonable threat.  It is inarguable that many shootings have been prevented as a result.  Is that practice of pointing handguns at suspects without the present intent to immediately shoot wrong?

In the last few years, some well-known gun writers and police trainers have been urging officers, agencies, and law enforcement in general, to consider that unless the officer immediately fires, the pointing of a firearm at a suspect is a “violation” of safety rules.  Pointing a gun, according to them, is therefore an inappropriate, unreasonable tactic.  What is the basis of their beliefs?  Range Safety Rule Number 2:  “Never let the muzzle cover anything you are not willing to destroy.”  This new idea will be referred as the “Rule 2 Negligence Standard.”

One trainer wrote that “while not a violation of law,” pointing a gun at a suspect and not shooting is a violation of the safety rules of gunhandling and should subject the officer to discipline by his agency.  This action should be considered as “causing” the officer and agency to be civilly liable.

It is important to understand why these well-intentioned individuals are mistaken in their beliefs, and how to argue against the inevitable accusations by plaintiffs and the media (as well as those in your own agency) who will take up the chorus in claiming that any pointing of a firearm at a suspect without firing it is a violation that should be subject to sanction and/or judgment.  These people are, in effect, attempting to create a new negligence standard for American law enforcement—one which is unnecessary and impractical.

As law enforcement trainers, there really are consequences to everything we do and say—often resulting in life-or-death.  If this misunderstanding of range rules in the street is permitted to grow and become “normalized” as part of training, the courts will sooner or later incorporate it into their understanding of “proper” police work and prevent any officer from muzzling someone without shooting.  From that moment on, any officer who points his or her weapon at a suspect and fails to fire will likely be guilty of excessive force.  The result?  More officers hesitating to draw guns, and more police shootings with suspects who thought they could beat the cop to the draw.  More suspects will be shot with a corresponding drastic increase in liability exposure.  And more officers are going to be shot down.

When addressing an issue with a “new interpretation” of an existing concept, care must be taken to extrapolate the possible consequences.  While well-intentioned, this concept has not been well thought out.  The old adage applies—be careful what you wish for, you may get it.

Bottom line:  When an officer has a reasonable belief that a suspect or situation might be dangerous or threatening, he or she may presently point a firearm at a suspect in order to ensure their safety.  It is lawful to do so.  And it is NOT in any way a safety violation of “range” safety rules to point a gun at a suspect(s) who may be armed, violent, or outnumber officers.

Tactical Reminder:  As I pointed out in an article entitled, “The Proper Weapon Hold on a Suspect” (The Police Marksman, November/December 1993), the proper method of holding a suspect at gunpoint is to keep the weapon pointed at the suspect’s waistband.  This permits observation of the suspect’s waistband and hands, allowing the officer to see threat cues, predatory positioning, and aggressive movement while still “on-target.”

POINTING A GUN CAN BE EXCESSIVE FORCE

An officer can now be subject to discipline and liability by pointing his weapon at an individual or group when the officer is unable to articulate the threat he or she felt existed at the time.  In the federal court's denial for a motion for summary judgment, the court stated that pointing a firearm (in this case, a submachinegun) at a subject is “excessive force” when there is no legal reason to do so is Baird v. Renbarger (7th Cir., 576 F.3d 346, January, 2010).  From the facts of the case it would be apparent to any reasonable officer that pointing a firearm at a person in this situation might be unreasonable:

• An officer who was verifying a VIN during a visit to an auto shop believed the VIN had been tampered with.
• Returning the next day with a search warrant, the officer pointed a subgun at the occupants of the business, and forced them at gunpoint to sit on the floor together. 
• The officer then detained the occupants of adjacent shops at gunpoint, including a group of Amish men, requiring them to sit with the others who were detained.

The federal district court determined that it was “objectively unreasonable” in these circumstances to aim a submachinegun at wholly compliant and non-threatening subjects.  The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals used the major factors within the totality of the facts known to the officer at the time of Graham v. Connor (1989):

• The severity of the crime at issue:  The crime of altering a VIN is one that is not associated with violence.  The court remarked, “…this is a far cry from crimes that contain the use of force as an element, crimes involving the possession of illegal weapons, or drug crimes, all of which are associated with violence.”
• The threat of the subject to officers or others:  This officer had been to the auto shop the day before, but articulated no belief that the occupants were threatening in any way.  On the day of the warrant service, all immediately complied with his and other officers’ orders.
• The active resistance or attempt to flee:  None of the detained subjects resisted at all or attempted to escape.  

Other courts have weighed in on this subject, ruling that an officer pointing a gun at a suspect absent indications of threat is excessive force, including the 9th Circuit in Robinson v. County of Solano (2002) and 3rd Circuit in Baker v. Monroe Township (2005).  Some of the facts in these and other cases leading to a finding of excessive force  or summary judgment motion(s) are:

• While investigating a crime of illegally shooting dogs, officers pointed a gun at a handcuffed, searched prisoner for an extended period of time.
• Detaining an infant/child/children at gunpoint.
• Pointing a gun at the head of an elderly man after he had been handcuffed.
• Generally it is not justified to point any firearm at a compliant individual when the circumstances are not threatening.  Even if the circumstances were threatening a few moments ago, as soon as that changes, officers must reflect those changes in their behavior and stop pointing guns at compliant or restrained people.

Bottom line:  Point a firearm at a person only when you can articulate your reasonable perception of danger this person poses to you or others, whether it is through their acts or their connection to the dangerous circumstances in which you find yourself.  Failing to be able to explain why you needed to point your weapon at someone can create huge problems for you.

Note: After the submission of this article, the juries in Baird and in Robinson decided in favor of the officers, their verdicts were that there was no excessive force in these cases. That said, the federal circuits are weighing in, and officers should take note that pointing firearms at a person whom the officer does not reasonably perceive as threatening is considered to be excessive force.

THE COURTS SUPPORT OFFICERS POINTING GUNS AT PEOPLE WHEN JUSTIFIED

The US Supreme Court has always held that it is permissible for the police to point guns at people suspected of violent or weapon-related crimes.  This includes those who are suspected of a non-violent crime but who are known to have carried weapons in the past.  Federal Circuit Courts and Courts of Appeal routinely have ruled that officers may hold people at gunpoint when the circumstances reasonably create the fear of violence.  Even the 9th Circuit in Duran v. City of Maywood (2002) stated that two officers moving toward the location of a shots-fired call with their handguns drawn did not increase the likelihood of a shooting.

When an officer reasonably believes the circumstances could be possibly threatening or violent, especially those involving drugs, weapons, or violent individuals, the drawing and pointing of a weapon is wholly permitted.

TOOLS OF INTIMIDATION?

Proponents of this “Rule 2 Negligence Standard” argue that the police firearm is not intended to be “tool of intimidation.”  I would argue that every police tool, from “command presence” to OC Spray, the Taser, baton, Police Service Dog, and every firearm is a tool of intimidation.  The very presence of a police officer who is confronting a criminal suspect is inherently intimidating.  The uniform, bearing, and the weapons the officer carries are designed to be so.

The US Supreme Court in Graham supports this concept of intimidation of suspects, stating, “The right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some form of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it” (emphasis added).  The Court recognizes that intimidation is part of law enforcement.  It is hard to argue that there is a higher level of intimidation other than directing a muzzle directly at a person and telling them to stop their behavior or they will be shot.  The realization of their mortal vulnerability as well as the officers’ intent causes most suspects to comply to avert a shooting.

VIOLATING “RANGE RULES”?

There can be little question that a firearm is a dangerous tool.  It is designed and intended to harm a living being in defense of life (or hunting for meat).  Its carry and display must be regulated and training imposed upon officers in order to reasonably minimize the chance for tragedy by preventing unintentional discharges. 

Range rules were developed through hard won wisdom.  A moment’s inattention or distraction and someone is needlessly injured or killed.  As the range rules have been promulgated and enforced, injuries from firearms accidents have steadily decreased.  Firing ranges are generally safe places to be as a result.

The National Rifle Association’s “Gun Safety Rules” include only three parts:  1. Always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction;  2. Always keep your finger off the trigger until ready to shoot;  3.  Always keep the gun unloaded until ready to use.  This is a good start for gun safety, especially on a cold range where weapons remain unloaded until directed.

The late Jeff Cooper of the American Pistol Institute at Gunsite Ranch in Arizona developed a version of these rules, one that many officers have been trained in.  The four so-called “inviolate” Firearms Safety Rules are:  1.  All guns are always loaded;  2.  Never let the muzzle cover anything you are not willing to destroy;  3.  Keep your finger off the trigger until your sights are on the target;  4.  Always be sure of your target.  This article is not intended to discuss the efficacy of these range rules as they are generally stated (which should certainly be up for discussion).  Rather, the application and intention of Safety Rule Number Two will be discussed.

The trainers and writers who are promulgating the “never point a firearm at a suspect unless you intend to shoot” negligence standard explain that while it is legal to point a firearm at a person in limited cases, it is a “violation” of the safety rules.  It is therefore unsafe and should be prohibited.  They agree that having your handgun (or shoulder weapon) in your hands early is a good thing in possibly dangerous circumstances (because, as we all know, the fastest drawn gun is the one that is already in your hand).  They argue the in-hand weapon should be held in a low-ready or off the line of the suspect until the decision to shoot is made.  Additionally they note that there is little difference in reaction-response times between a properly positioned weapon that is held off-target and one that is held on-target.  This, they reason, will reduce or eliminate the possibility of injury due to unintentional discharge and resulting civil liability. 

While some of their reasoning for why they believe an officer should not point guns at people they do not intend to shoot may be useful in limiting liability, the purpose of an officer possessing a firearm is not about civil liability prevention.  It is rather about defense of life and creating compliance.

• Defense of life.  The main purpose for carrying a firearm is to shoot another person to save life.  Stopping a suspect’s imminent or actual threat to life by shooting bullets through their body is the only reliable and proven method of quickly stopping life-threatening behavior.  Shooting a person necessarily requires the muzzle to be pointed at them.  Proponents of the “Rule 2 Negligence Standard” are not against officers shooting people who earn getting shot.  Their concerns are how and when that muzzle is brought on target.  That is the center of this discussion.
• Creating Compliance.  Many, if not a universal experience, officers have had the experience of a non-compliant suspect in a dangerous situation, or possibly armed, suddenly become compliant when confronted by the muzzle of a police weapon.  Almost all people understand there is a fine line between a gun being pointed at you and that gun being fired at you.

What creates compliance when muzzling a suspect?  The fear of being shot.  The presence of a handgun in police confrontations is universal—officers carry handguns at all times.  A handgun in an officer’s hand is an increase in the degree of the threat to the suspect.  The suspect’s perception of the threat posed by an officer’s handgun muzzle pointing directly at him is dramatic.  A pistol in-hand is cautionary, a firearm pointing at you is a whole other universe of reality—that’s imminent and real.  Confrontations with an armed suspect results in compliance because that suspect knows that if he tries to outdraw a handgun pointing at him, he’ll lose.  Simply put, many, many shootings are prevented because officers muzzle suspects.

SO HOW DO WE TRAIN IT OUT OF COPS?

So let’s say we do adopt the “Rule 2 Negligence Standard” and declare that pointing a gun without shooting to be a violation of policy, tactics, safety, and, eventually, law.  What will the result be?

• Slower response to deadly threats.  Most will agree that officers today are much slower to respond with force than their forbearers.  This reflects our society at this time.  It must be considered that by adopting the “Rule 2 Negligence Standard,” officers will likely be even slower to draw and fire their weapons than they are today.  Of course, there will be an attendant increase in shootings, and the resultant increase in both suspect and officer injuries and death.
• increased allegations of misconduct.  Due to more sophisticated offenders who already take advantage of the system, the allegations (both true and false) of “the officer pointed his weapon at me” will increase.  This will be especially true in both criminal and civil courts.  The “he said/she said” nature of many of these complaints will cast a pall across law enforcement, causing many to leave their handguns in their holsters until the last possible moment before a shooting for fear of being falsely accused of brandishing.
• A natural response to great threat.  In highly threatening circumstances, officers will point their guns at a suspect due to their own fear and desire to prevent a shooting.  Many officers, if not most, have had the experience of facing a suspect whose actions were so intense and threatening that the officer could have legally shot him but didn’t for one reason or another.  Universally, these incidents were emotionally startling in their intensity and focus.  Having a weapon in one’s hand and, if given time, NOT threatening a dangerous person with it before a shooting is not natural.  It would be a very difficult training issue and a behavior that could not be prevented.

Pointing a firearm at a suspect in a dangerous, possibly imminently threatening situation is something that we cannot “train out of officers.”

• Hard-wired response.  It is a hard-wired human behavior to throw our hands and arms forward and up between that which we perceive as suddenly threatening and ourselves when startled.  This action has been termed the “startle reflex.”
• Posturing to prevent violence.  Humans who feel threatened but are not yet engaged in combat, tend to “posture” in an attempt to intimidate their adversary.  They point the most dangerous weapon they have at that other person before blows are exchanged in hopes that the other person will become discouraged and demoralized, and desist or submit.  This intimidation is designed to avoid physical conflict.  When posturing, unarmed combatants will point their fingers or shake their fists.  If armed with a knife, it will be displayed between the two parties and pointed at the other person as a warning.  A club will be ominously swung in the direction of threat, or struck against an object as an example of the consequences of engaging in physical conflict.  Guns are pointed as a display of warning and threat.
• A threat of last resort.  Pointing a gun is the highest level of threat—short of actually shooting the suspect—an officer has.  A pointed gun and a yelling officer are wholly intended to transmit the message that “There is nothing left except to shoot you, so comply with my orders.”

How is something this instinctive to be trained out of an officer?  It can’t be.  The result of the “Rule 2 Negligence Standard” requirements will be that many officers will be disciplined and possibly lose their jobs as a result of their natural and instinctive response to their perception of great danger.  Citizen complaints will increase.  False accusations of officers brandishing will become the norm by criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs.  Officers will be forced to defend the negative—arguing that something did not occur.  The civil liability exposure for “excessive force” will dramatically increase, resulting in more lawsuits and increased litigation costs, settlements, and adverse judgments.

REASONABLY MUZZLING A SUSPECT IS SIMPLY NOT A “VIOLATION”

There is no “violation” of range safety rules when pointing a weapon at a suspect when the situation is sufficiently threatening.  Rule #2 states:  “Never let the muzzle cover anything you are not willing to destroy.”  It says, “…willing to destroy,” not going to destroy.  This is a paper target rule when taken literally. 

A police officer who muzzles a suspect, as discussed, is conveying the willingness to shoot that person.  However, that officer is communicating to that individual that he simply has not made the decision to shoot him yet, but is very, very close.  The decision as to whether or not the suspect will be shot is now up to the suspect and his actions.

The law as interpreted by the courts permits officers to point guns at suspects in circumstances that justify it.  An officer who points a gun at a suspect is implicitly telling that suspect to change his behavior immediately or he’ll be shot.  As Clint Smith says, “The muzzle of a .45 pretty much means ‘go away’ in any language.”

The “Rule 2 Negligence Standard” is a misunderstanding of the rules intended to increase range safety and safer gun-handling.  Officers in the street work under a different context.  They not only shoot to protect life, but attempt to protect life by reasonably intimidating a threatening suspect by pointing a weapon at him. 

By adopting the “Rule 2 Negligence Standard,” it will likely be sooner rather than later that officers will be prohibited by the courts from employing this important safety practice.  Yes, unintentional discharges occur, but not at a greater frequency than before.  And when they happen, agencies will settle with the plaintiff to compensate for the loss.  But the shooting of more suspects who attempt to fight their way out of an arrest when confronted by an officer who is hamstrung in their last-ditch ability to convince a suspect that the only way out without risking serious injury or death is to comply will be out of proportion to the very limited number of injuries from unintentional discharges.  Sometimes pointing a gun at a suspect is the only chance an officer has to prevent a shooting.

Adopting this misinterpretation of “Safety Rule 2” will increase civil liability beyond anything now seen from the few unintentional discharges that occur annually in the US.  Many more suspects will be shot, injured, and killed as a result of its adoption.  More to the point will be the needless loss of police officers in the line of duty because of a misinterpretation of something that was originally designed to keep them and all gun owners safer. 

Instructors and administrators:  Let’s really think about the very real consequences of this before incorporating it into our legal and tactical doctrine.

It’s no secret that there are unreasonable people in this world—otherwise, you wouldn’t have a job.  A suspect who resists the inevitability of being handcuffed, forces you and other officers to use your body weight to control him long enough to get him restrained.  But what of the handcuffed prisoner who continues to struggle and attempts to harm officers?  In the past, hobbles and continued body weight have been the answer.  This method of continued restraint, however, is being misrepresented to courts around the country as something that predictably results in suspect death, leading to  adverse judgments and case law negatively affecting your ability to control the unreasonable suspect safely. 

The possibility of a prisoner suddenly dying in custody from “excited delirium” must be considered by arresting officers whenever a prisoner continues to violently thrash and flail about.  When a prisoner unexpectedly dies following being restrained in handcuffs, allegations of unlawful death soon follow.  In the inevitable lawsuit, plaintiffs allege that the officers’ actions killed—or even murdered—the decedent, despite the autopsy’s finding of minor bruising and scrapes with no forensic evidence of fatal abuse.  Their theory is, “The police used force.  The suspect died.  Ergo, the police killed him.  Pay us money.” 

Plaintiffs will advance the discredited theory of “positional asphyxia,” especially if a hobble is employed during the restraint—which they label as “hogtying.”  They accuse the officers of knowingly placing the suspect into a possibly deadly situation—proned out with multiple officers kneeling on top of him.  This act of kneeling upon the suspect while attempting to restrain his arms is alleged to have compressed his upper torso, causing his death due to asphyxiation.  They and their experts (often high-ranking former police officers) reject the science of physiology and the history of excited delirium and in-custody deaths, blaming officers and their methods.  The latest case adverse to the police is Abston v. City of Merced (9th Circuit. 2013).

Excited delirium is not a new theory that was developed, as alleged by plaintiffs, to justify officer misconduct and the murder of people.  Dr. Luther Bell, a physician specializing in mental health issues recognized that some patients died while in an agitated state.  He named this manner of death, “Bell’s Syndrome,” or “excited delirium” in 1849.  We have seen this syndrome manifest in suspect and prisoner deaths in modern policing where various methods of restraint or force have been blamed.

• 1986: Neck Restraints.  As a result of multiple in-custody deaths, LA County Deputy Coroner Ronald N. Kornblum, M.D., publishes a report concluding that the bar-arm restraint taught to LAPD officers was the cause of death due to compression of the trachea and vessels of the neck.  60% of all police departments banned the carotid restraint leading to a 650% increase in suspect injuries, and a 560% increase in officer injuries the following year (Source:  LAPD).
• Mid-1990s: Oleoresin Capsicum Spray.  OC, or pepper spray, because it inflames the mucous membranes and decreases the airways, causes death according to the ACLU.
• Mid-1990s to present:  TASER.  The TASER is alleged to cause the subject’s eventual death minutes or hours later.
• Mid-1990s to present: Police body weight.  Kneeling on a person, even though that individual remains alive after the weight is removed, inevitably causes death.

Excited delirium is a medical problem that can lead to death.  It is not a police-caused phenomenon.  That said, like a bad habit, it is very difficult to eradicate the idea of positional asphyxia because plaintiffs and their experts have a financial interest in keeping this concept alive.

Compression asphyxia is a preventable danger.  With sufficient time and weight on the upper body, the suspect’s ability to breathe is so limited that suffocation is possible.  Like an anaconda snake killing its prey:  every time the suspect breathes out, the body weight of the officers prevents the suspect from reinflating his lungs fully—eventually the lung capacity is so limited it cannot support life.  If enough weight is kept on the upper torso, oxygen levels become critical and the body dies.  However, officers removing their weight from the subject before death occurs permits that individual to recover.  Like an athlete who works to peak effort, stopping the exercise results in a return to stasis.  If the officers remove their weight after handcuffing the individual, and he is able to speak and breathe, it is not the officers’ kneeling on him that kills the prisoner—it is likely excited delirium.

Despite plaintiff experts’ opining that “Everyone knows that kneeling on a struggling subject kills people, and they ought to restrain them in a manner similar to that used in mental hospitals,” there is no practical method that effectively takes charge of a resisting suspect other than body weight until they are handcuffed.  The suspect who continues to violently resist or attempts to harm officers remains problematic.

One Handcuffed Prisoner, Two Officers

When the subject is taken to the ground, the only practicable solution to prevent his rolling on to his back is to use body weight to his upper torso.  To date, this is the only practical method developed to initially get him handcuffed.  Until now, there has been no real alternative to restraining a violent handcuffed prisoner other than through applied bodyweight.  A new method of restraining a violent handcuffed prisoner without bodyweight or significant force by two officers has been developed and promises to be an effective alternative to kneeling on a handcuffed subject.  Let’s walk through the arrest process. 

When a proned suspect refuses to comply, rather than wrestle his arms to the small of his back into cuffing position, it is far simpler and much more practical to simply handcuff each wrist at the first possible moment.  This provides a handle on each wrist as well as pain compliance.  Now each arm is forced to his back and the empty cuffs are cuffed together—cuff the cuffs.  Once the handcuffs are secured and he finally stops resisting, the handcuffs can be adjusted and the prisoner transported in one set of restraints.

If the prisoner continues to unreasonably flail about, attempting to injure himself or others, his health and welfare now becomes the responsibility of the officers.  To safely restrain him further, both officers move to either side of his torso.  Each officer puts his knees to the ground, and scoots up against the suspect’s shoulders and elbows, using their legs to press the suspect’s arms against his body.

Both officers working together pin the suspect between them.  There is no body weight necessary to press him to the ground.  A very strong and determined individual may require an officer to press down on his shoulder blade with fingertip pressure to keep his arm in contact with that officer’s legs—the pressure needed is surprisingly light.  Sometimes a prisoner will attempt to spin out from the officers, but this is dealt with simply by the officers repositioning, shuffling on their knees to keep the suspect pinned between them both.  If he kicks, a hobble can be used to keep the legs together.

Prevent the Appearance of Misconduct

When you respond to a call of a disrobing, screaming, growling, grunting individual who is acting wildly, aggressing lights, with an apparent intense dislike of glass and shiny objects and very hot to the touch, this is an individual who is in immediate need of medical aid and sedation by paramedics.  However, it is the police who must restrain him using their tactics and force tools so paramedics have the opportunity to save his life.  Staging the medics early should always be considered as this person is exhibiting signs of sudden in-custody death.

In order to prevent a prolonged struggle by this drugged or deranged subject who exhibits immunity to pain as well as superhuman strength, the optimal method of quick restraint is a TASER.  Once down and under TASER power, he needs to be quickly placed into handcuffs.  There is nothing as effective as the officers’ body weight to do this, pinning his upper torso to the ground as the wrists are handcuffed. 

Once cuffed, all weight is removed from the prisoner’s body, and the officers use their knees to pinch him between them, preventing him from significantly moving but not in any way affecting his ability to breathe.  If he continues to kick, a hobble can be placed around the ankles and cinched up, with the tail left unattached or held by a third officer.  If he attempts to slam his head into the ground, placing a hand on his head and keeping it pinned to the ground is sufficient.  If he is so determined that he threatens to roll, a hand to his shoulder blade, requiring little force keeps him secured.  In this manner, he may be held indefinitely—and safely—until paramedics arrive and take custody of him.

This is an extremely effective method of protecting the prisoner from himself while also preventing the violently out of control subject from harming officers.  It is deceptively simple, and is often greeted with skepticism by officers until they actually attempt it and find it a practical solution to a problem to which there really has been no satisfactory solution.

While the fiction of positional asphyxia will likely not go away, the problem of suspects dying in-custody due to their own drug-taking may be minimized.  Additionally, as more and more paramedics are authorized to treat this cluster of signs with ketamine and other injectable drugs to immediately calm and suspend the subject’s ability to physically resist, even more will be prevented.

Now there is an alternative to using body weight to control a handcuffed violently resisting prisoner.  If the suspect dies following his being restrained, it may not stop plaintiffs and others from accusing the police of causing the death, but it will eliminate some ammunition for their arguments.  And it is more effective in maintaining control of the handcuffed prisoner.  This is a win-win for officers and the prisoners they are attempting to protect from themselves.

This is one in a series of "Why Do We Teach?" articles focusing on training subjects in police academies, in-service training. Not just police related, these concepts and methods are often commonly taught. The series details why we either teach that concept, modify it, or reject in favor of a more practical solution. If you teach it, it must be defensible, pragmatic, applicable to real-life combat and survival, and lawfully justifiable.

Many handgun shooters use the “Sul” Position” as a “combat ready” position, both on the range and in the street.  The Sul Position is characterized by the weapon hand being held close to the torso approximately at solar plexus level, muzzle down, with the support-hand in various positions as needed or trained.  The muzzle is intended to be directed just to the side of the lead leg to comply with safety rules of never allowing the muzzle to cover anything you are not willing to destroy or kill.  It is also presently fashionable as seen in many magazines and training videos.  So it makes sense to train cops or responsible citizens to use the Sul Position as a safe combat ready position, right? 

Well, no, not really.  The Sul Position is not suitable as a combatives ready position, and was never intended for that purpose.  Often, when something becomes a “position” or “technique”—especially when someone gives something everyone does a name—it becomes both fashionable and misunderstood.  Doing anything because someone else does it without knowing why they are doing it that way can lead to wasted years of training, or worse, tragedy, injury, and sometimes loss of life.  The Sul as a ready stance decreases efficiency of the weapon’s presentation and can create a safety problem.

Sul:  a little history and reasoning

“Sul” is Portugese for “south,” and was originally developed in Brazil.  The original intent was to provide a safer way to move with a handgun in-hand through a crowd or past a person without muzzling anyone. 

How it works:  From a practical ready position with the handgun in a one- or two-hand hold, muzzle directed toward the threat area, the Sul is performed by bringing the weapon to the torso with the muzzle directed downward, or south, and pointed off to the side of the support-hand’s leg (if in the right-hand, the muzzle is directed down and just to the side of the left-leg).  As the muzzle moves downward into the Sul, the support-hand either comes off the grip and flattens naturally, palm down on the torso (ready to quickly move into a two-hand grip), or it comes up over the weapon, covering it.

The support-hand is available to reach out and grab a subject if the situation demands (never the first choice with a firearm in-hand, but being forced to go hands-on with a threatening or resistive subject happens far too often to be ignored or simply dismissed by saying, “Never touch anyone with a gun in your hand”).  Your support-hand may reach out and touch a person you are moving past, ensuring you know their position, to let him know you are moving past, and making sure he doesn’t move unexpectedly.

If moving through a crowd, the weapon moves into a safer muzzle position against the body, and the support-hand moves to cover the weapon as the first line of defense against weapon retention threats.  The support-hand comes off the handgun as needed to guide others, creating a path to quickly move through the crowd while still having the handgun in-hand.  As quickly as the support-hand moves from the weapon to reach out, it comes back, covering the weapon as the shooter continues to move. 

When the shooter is past the individual or through the crowd, the muzzle comes up and the weapon again floats away from the mid-torso, pointing wherever the shooter needs it for quick response to imminent threat. 

The Sul as a Ready Position is Problematic

Because so many lawful shootings in defense of life are an immediate response to a reasonable perception of imminent threat behavior, everything the shooter does must be efficient to obtain first rounds hits on target—as well as each subsequent round.  Hits are the only thing that counts in a gunfight, and looking good in a cool stance or weapon hold just before you die doesn’t. 

Neural pathways (muscle-memory) are created by doing the same efficient movement the same way, getting the same consistent results.  The Sul cannot support habits of efficient weapon presentation because it was never intended to be a “Ready Position,” and its fundamental presentation mechanics are faulty.

Flipping the muzzle.  A “ready position” facilitates the weapon smoothly—and rapidly—interrupting the eye-target line with the muzzle (actually, the bore-axis) aligned with the threat and with minimal disturbance to that critical alignment, ready to put a bullet into the target.  The handgun in the Sul Position is both flat against the body and the muzzle is down.  As the handgun is brought up and punched out, the shooter must accomplish a lot more than just presenting the weapon to the target.  The handgun must rotate in two directions—laterally and vertically—while speeding to get on target.  While a three-pound weight held in your hand(s) at the end of your arm(s) doesn’t seem like much, the rotational forces while punching out all combine to create the critical problem of precisely controlling muzzle flip.  Flipping the muzzle creates muzzle over-travel and inconsistent first round hits. 

Rigidity in the body, shoulders, and arms.  Creating a technique creates mental mind-games in many shooters.  It is not unusual to see shooters on the line, handgun in-hand in the Sul Position, waiting for the execute command, their entire body rigid, elbows held out at their sides and sometimes unnaturally forward.  This becomes a variation of a position of attention, locked both mentally and physically.  Brain studies show that if we are “doing something,” the brain must first tell the body to stop “doing this,” and then find the neural pathways to tell the body to begin “doing that.”  This is measured in tenths of a second for each command—first to stop, and then to begin.  Ready stances should be relaxed and as natural as possible. 

Muzzling one’s body parts.  There are safety issues with this position as it is normally practiced.  It is not unusual for a shooter using the Sul to muzzle body parts, whether a foot, leg, or, um…other highly valued body parts.  When the Sul Position becomes a ready position, it is easy to lose track of the muzzle because the eyes are downrange watching the threat target or searching for one.  The most common safety violation we see on the range is from those trained in the Sul pointing their weapon at their own bodies. 

What Should be Taught?

There is nothing wrong with moving the muzzle in any direction safety demands.  On the range, that’s easy—downrange where the backstop is located.  On the street, that can be problematic.  Cutting Edge Training’s Master Trainer, Thomas V. Benge, developed the idea that the weapon should be pointed in the “safer” direction—the area where the least amount of injury or damage will occur if the weapon is discharged.  Sometimes that direction will be downward depending upon the context of the situation.  Sometimes its safest pointing at that person you might be forced to shoot.

With a weapon in-hand, there is an anticipated need for a possible immediate response or the handgun would still be holstered.  The muzzle of any in-hand handgun (or firearm) should be pointed in a safer direction toward the possible Threat.  Whether or not the weapon should be leveled at the individual depends upon his behavior and your reasonable perception of imminent danger of death or serious physical injury.  For more about when and when not to point a firearm at a person, see our blog article: “Pointing Firearms: Range Safety vs. Reality.”

We suggest a “floating” ready position, that is, the weapon floats to and away from your body as the situation demands, pointing at the Threat or possible threat location until it is safer to point somewhere else. 

• With the weapon lightly gripped in your dominant-hand while traveling from one point to another toward the suspect’s threat’s location, both hands on the weapon, your upper body is loose and relaxed.  Loose muscles move faster than tense muscles (fewer neural commands seeking pathways to achieve movement).
• As your perception of threat increases, your grip will tighten as the weapon naturally floats out farther from your body toward the threat.  We also see the weapon getting higher, nearer to the eye-target line.
• Upon challenging a possible threat, your arms move to near maximum extension below the eye-target line, generally in the crotch/belt buckle area as you make shoot/no-shoot decisions.  The muzzle is on the subject.  This allows you to see his hands and waistband.  This is a deadly force warning that, if the circumstances permit, will likely be accompanied by an oral warning to comply.
• If the perception of imminent threat to life is sudden, the weapon is quickly pushed forward and brought up, interrupting the eye-target line well before the arms are extended, and the trigger depressed as the weapon is slowing to a stop. 

Rather than a fixed position, the ready position moves as the situation changes.  The weapon moves up and down, left and right, away and back until it is punched out as a warning or a deadly force response to a reasonably perceived imminent threat. 

The concept of the Sul is absolutely valid—it just is not useful as a “ready position.”  If crossing, either an uninvolved person, a teammate, or through a crowd, the weapon moves against your body, muzzle pointing down and away from body parts, with the support-hand either touching, grabbing, or moving someone, or covering the weapon.  The Sul is useful until it is again time to point the weapon in a safer direction—the suspected or actual position of the Threat. 

This is one in a series of "Why Do We Teach?" articles focusing on training subjects in police academies, in-service training. Not just police related, these concepts and methods are often commonly taught. The series details why we either teach that concept, modify it, or reject in favor of a more practical solution. If you teach it, it must be defensible, pragmatic, applicable to real-life combat and survival, and lawfully justifiable.

Cops fall, especially when working in the dark.  Everyone’s been injured to some degree at some point in their career from falling.  Stepping off a curb you didn’t know was there, finding a hole in the ground while walking across grass, being pushed over a coffee table, walking on ice or slippery surfaces, or falling up or down stairs, doing anything in the dark, being taken down during training—all can result in your going down hard to ground.  So it makes sense to train cops in martial arts rolls and breakfalls, right? 

Well, no, not really.  It is actually a waste of very valuable training time.

The training of recruits as well as in-service officers in defensive tactics involves a great deal of material that must be mastered in very little time.  Unless a recruit or officer already possesses an athletic background involving rolling or tumbling, or is an experienced martial artist, training time devoted to rolling and breakfalls cannot achieve the desired goal of inoculating these individuals from injuries from falls.  The limited time available to create minimal competence in defensive tactics and arrest and control is simply insufficient to gain mastery—or even competency—in the ability to prevent fall injuries later in their career.  Absent their own independent training and practice, the typical officer will never again practice rolls and breakfalls to the point where it becomes unconsciously automatic during an unexpected fall.  Spending ten hours in the academy learning how to roll and breakfall without continuing practice is ten hours that might be spent learning a skill or tactic that might later benefit the officer’s survival. 

Martial Arts Training as the Basis of Police Training is Problematic

In the martial arts, “how to safely fall” is routinely taught to decrease the injuries from training as well as to provide a safety mechanism when the student is sparring.  Training often begins with basic shoulder rolls, and then to break falls until the student is capable of safely falling from a hard throw on to a mat or even on to an unprotected surface.  As the training progresses to increasingly more difficult and dangerous throws, different and more effective breakfalls are needed, practiced, and mastered.  Martial arts training involves years of consistent and regular training to achieve competency in fundamental tasks that also involve rolling and falling.  Dedicated personal training effort creates an unconscious mastery.  This permits an individual to automatically roll or break their fall when they unexpectedly lose balance.  Absent this type of intensive and extended training, no one can be considered to be skilled in safely falling from the number of hours and repetitions received solely from academy or in-service training.

Martial arts training involves years of consistent and regular training to achieve competency in fundamental tasks that also involve rolling and falling.  Dedicated personal training effort creates an unconscious mastery.  This permits an individual to automatically roll or break their fall when they unexpectedly lose balance.  Absent this type of intensive and extended training, no one can be considered to be skilled in safely falling from the number of hours and repetitions received solely from academy or in-service training.

Defending the Curriculum

Because Defensive Tactics training seems to be a natural result of martial arts training, almost all academy curriculum contains varying amounts of time dedicated to teaching recruits how to fall.  For example, a new DT curriculum for police recruit academy training was being developed by a Defensive Tactics Subject Matter Expert who asked for my review.  The first subject was “Rolls and Breakfalls.”  When asked why the recruits would be spending eight per cent of the course on developing this skill, this highly experienced police officer and very accomplished martial artist answered that every cop needs to know how to protect themselves from falls on the job.  For him, the need for this training content was automatic, something intrinsic to his deep experience in martial arts.  This brought on a line of questioning that became increasingly more difficult to justify.  When finally asked if he thought, absent previous training, the recruits would gain automatic, unconscious competency from this time spent in this activity, he thought, and then admitted that it was very unlikely.  His assumption, that every officer must be able to protect from fall injuries whenever and however they might occur may be valid.  When faced with the reality of the limitations inherent to recruit and police training, that standard is not achievable. 

Officers leave the academy and are instantly in the big leagues--officers have been murdered on their first day of patrol.  The non-martial artists, representing most recruits and officers, have little time to prepare to face every manner and threat of suspect.  Cops are many times more likely to become involved in a physical fight than a shooting, and much more likely to be sued for the simple application of control holds than they are for shootings.  Defensive tactics training, regardless of how much time is allotted to it, is by definition less than desirable for any officer.  There just isn’t sufficient training time in any agency’s budget or schedule to commit the personnel to gaining anything more than minimal competency. 

Every topic in any defensive tactics program must be scrutinized for its realistic value to the officer on the street.  This is measured by the average officer’s ability to successfully apply the skill or tactic on-time, in-time against an unwilling suspect.  This requires the training to provide sufficient time and repetitions to minimally acquire a level of at least conscious competency (although this is not “mastery,” officers can perform the skill or tactic but must think about how to do it).  Will an officer who is three years out of the academy, being assaulted in the dark and shoved off-balance, be able to remember and perform that skill?  Frankly, the typical officer will not be able to execute a safe fall or roll during an unexpected fall.  If that is the case, why teach this topic in training?

Teaching martial arts rolls and breakfalls are a poor use of time when they are viewed from the officer’s very real need for functional knowledge at some distant time.  There simply is not enough time or the availability of frequent, recurrent training to gain even a minimum level of competency when reacting to suddenly falling or being thrown in a fight.  Even if that time and training budget were provided, there are other skills that would be more beneficial to an officer’s survival than rolls and breakfalls.

What Should be Taught?

Simple breakfalls should be covered to assist in maintaining the safety of the recruit or officer being taken down in training.  Explanations and practice of a simple PLF (Parachute Landing Fall) where the goal is to sequentially collapse the body without striking bony projections (knees, hips, elbows, shoulders, and especially the head) against the hard surface of the ground, will be better incorporated into training.  Through this, training is simplified and made safer. 

A level of competency might then be gained during the repetition afforded by takedowns in practice.  The recruit should receive several hundred repetitions of the same or similar fall during the course of the training.  The simple fact of hundreds of repetitions of more safely falling increases an individual’s expertise, and may lead to a behavior change in the future. 

However, more advanced breakfalls from throws, as well as martial arts rolls require an intensity and duration of practice that will never be provided by police training.  They are too varied and specialized, and this limits the number of reps that recruit or officer receives.  That time can be better spent elsewhere during this precious training time to develop their expertise on something that might actually later be useful. 

Active shooter.  That phrase creates many strong emotions in many of us.  For example, on December 14, 2012, a gunman shot his way into an elementary school where firearms, by law, are prohibited, murdering 27 children and teachers before taking his own life as law enforcement approached.  Yet on December 16, 2012, an off-duty Bexar County Sheriff’s sergeant shot and wounded a gunman who shot one person at a movie theater in San Antonio, Texas, ending what might have been another massacre of innocents.  As firearms instructors, there is no question that a person who is armed and willing to confront those who willfully and serendipitously murder the unarmed is the best way to stop the killing.  And if we can’t be the one at the tip of the spear, we want to the ones who taught that person how to end this senseless killing.

The question of the sufficiency of training must be addressed by those who not only train police officers, but also instruct legally armed citizens.  Some instructors will flatly state that only the elite military and SWAT operators should intervene, while others will set a more reasonable standard as that of an average police officer.  Due to the inundation of newscasts about the tragedies of Active Shooter events, you, like me, are probably being approached by legally armed citizens asking questions about how they might be able to protect their families and others in these situations.  The questions they are asking are, “What kind of training would be required to effectively stop that level of violence?  How long would that training take?  What kind of reoccurring practice would be required?

Questions such as these indicate thoughtfulness and a serious consideration of what is involved in possibly interrupting this type of attack.  Different individuals are going to gain proficiency differently given the same number of hours training, and then will maintain that proficiency to various degrees of competency.  Shooting is a perishable skill, and regular practice increases familiarity and may create increased skill if—and only if—that training is consciously performed.  When developing training or answering questions related to any training topic, the foundation must be within the context of the problem.  In this case, what training is sufficient to interrupt the murder of innocents, divert the shooting, and either physically stop the shooter, cause him to commit suicide, or create a situation that permits the police time to respond and intervene?

This level of skill development and mental preparation is likely much, much more than most citizens (and just as many police officers) are willing to do.  The reality is that hits with handguns at extended distance are more a matter of luck than skill while being shot at by your target.  Shooting on a square range on a sunny warm day with a range master and a red flag run up the flagpole may allow for consistent slow-fire hits on a man-sized target at 100 yards with a handgun.  However hitting a man who is moving, murdering people, and maybe shooting at you from 25 yards may be beyond what most people can reliably do with a handgun. 

If it is unlikely that the citizen or the officer armed with a handgun will be able to hit the Threat at realistic distances, why train anyone with a handgun to attempt to interdict an Active Shooter event?  Again, we must look at the context of the event.  According to Ron Borsch, 90% of suspects involved in an Active Shooter event commit suicide on-site (http://www.policemag.com/blog/swat/story/2008/05/active-shooter-response-revisited-part-1.aspx).  When confronted by any significant resistance, these people immediately turn their weapons on themselves.  The legally armed citizen who is able to quickly confront the Threat with fire may actually wound the individual.  Significantly, whether or not the Threat is hit, in most situations the murder of innocents is stopped as his attention is diverted and the threat is soon ended.

After decades of studying these events (having coined the term, “Active Shooter” with Jeff Martin in 1999), it is my belief that any intervention by a legally armed citizen or police officer will generally end the attack on the innocent, and the earliest intervention regardless of whether or not the citizen or officer actually hits the Threat (the criminal gunman) will save lives.  If the statistics are correct, approximately two-thirds of these events are stopped by either the legally armed citizen or police officer (Ron Borsch). 

WHAT KIND OF TRAINING?

To prepare any person to competently and contextually respond to this type of defensive shooting, I believe the training would minimally entail:

• Familiarity with the laws of deadly force in your state.  It is vital if you are going to carry a handgun that you understand when you can legally press a trigger, when you cannot, and know what to say and do following that shooting.  Saving your life or someone else's may be a good thing, but spending your life in prison following the shooting because you don’t understand the law or you say the wrong thing to police detectives is probably not on your bucket list.
• Sufficient marksmanship skills.  While tight groups on a paper target do not automatically translate into solid hits on a gunman who is shooting at you, putting bullets through the bad guy with combat accuracy is how shootings are generally ended.  Combat accuracy is defined as any hit disrupting the imminent threat.  For those who have never felt bullets just missing them, with the corresponding adrenal dump and the well-known effects on perception, decision-making processes, and the ability to accurately fire a weapon, shooting at paper in a slow-fire method without a care in the world is as dissimilar as flying an F-22 combat jet and a single-prop Cessna airplane.  Both are airplanes, both take off and land, and both move through the air, but that is where the similarity ends.  Again, hits matter, but any shots disrupting the gunman’s murder spree is sufficient, and sometimes just knowing he is being shot at may cause him to shoot himself.
• Sufficiently aggressive mindset.  You have to be willing to make yourself a target: when you move aggressively, it will be different from every other person who is fleeing, inviting him to target you; when you begin firing, you will also invite him to target you.  Your willingness to do this will be answered only when there is lead in the air and blood is flowing.  The moral question of whether or not it is morally acceptable to shoot and possibly kill another human being must be resolved before you hope to act on-time, in-time.  You cannot hope to act decisively when you have sights on the Threat and hesitate, wondering if it is moral to shoot this person.    This question must be resolved prior to carrying a firearm.  An appropriately aggressive mindset will be enhanced by mental imagery, imagining your response to this deadly situation in vivid detail.  In this way, you will create memories of actions, facilitating your schema, or mental maps, to quickly orient to the situation, avoid being shocked, and giving you that feeling of, “Oh yeah.  I know what to do!’  These mental patterns permit you to act decisively in a situation where aggressive action (either fighting or fleeing) is safer than non-action.  Firearms instructor John Farnham accurately said, "A confused countenance always locks you in position and generates a focused response by predators.”
• Sufficient tactical competency.  Knowing the human limitations of responding to a deadly attack, as well as the tactics that can give you time to react and positively respond allows you to fight when you are surprised by the sudden nearby gunfire.  How to use cover or concealment (and knowing the difference), how to move safely to position yourself to shoot the bad guy, and how to respond when he targets you will be required.  Ensuring you have a clear gun-target line (the imaginary line between the muzzle of your handgun and the targeted area on the Threat) as well as a reasonably clear background (to protect innocents when you miss the Threat) will be necessary.
• Sufficient understanding of police response.  In this case, police officers responding to this violent event will be both frightened and excited, and will have a high degree of urgency to end the event.  While it is in everyone's best interest for the police to arrive early, they are not your friend at this moment.  Standing in a public place with a handgun in your hand where shots have been fired with innocents down will not be healthy for you when the police arrive.  Understanding how to survive this second threat to your life is as vital as surviving the first.

Practically speaking (rather than the ideal minimum training above), a legally armed citizen actually needs just two things to make a difference disrupting the Active Shooter event:  a loaded weapon that functions every time the trigger is pressed, and the guts to get into the fight. 

HOW MUCH TRAINING?

The honest answer to this is:  As much as you think you need and are willing to pay for in range time, ammunition, and training hours.  If I told you that in one week you are going to face a murderous shooter who will attempt to take your life, your family’s lives, and dozens of innocents’ lives, what level of training would you want to have under your belt?  IF this happens to you (a big if, but then again, if it happens to you, it's 100%), what capability do you want to have?  The real question that can only be answered by the student is, “How much preparation is practical for you for an event that can happen, may happen, but likely will not happen to you?” 

For example, I was driving within 5 miles of the Clackamas Town Center  mall shooting when it began (Oregon, 12/11/12).  10,000 people in the mall all have a story to tell about what they experienced in an event that took the lives to two innocents and wounded a third.  This occurred in a metropolitan area of approximately 1.5 million people.  For most of the 10,000, no training was necessary because they fled at the sound of gunshots and sight of people surging past them, or they were locked down in stores.  Perhaps only 300 people in the mall may have been able to make a difference and would have benefitted from being armed and having undergone this training.  There are reports of one concealed pistol permit holder who pointed his handgun at the Threat but did not take the shot because of innocents in the background.  This young man believes the murderer saw him with the handgun, and then took his own life moments later.

For some of us, it was a case study on what these events look like, how they unfold, and to ask how I might better react to protect myself, my family, and those around me as a legally armed citizen or police officer.  After each Active Shooter event, I ask myself, “How might I modify my training courses to better meet the needs of my students?”  For most people, however, it was just another horror-filled event that shocked them out of their denial for a few days before they re-entered their imaginary and safe “gun-free zones” where the police protect them from all harm and their belief that if they are nice people, no harm will come to them. 

The question of how this training should be delivered lies in frequent, short duration, high-intensity training sessions.  This training regimen is far more valuable to skill development and retention than a long course where the same intensity is sustained over days.  Therefore, most training courses should be three to four hours max, with subsequent training sessions weekly or semi-weekly. 

A basic course for a first-time shooter to gain sufficient competence to build upon through independent practice and minimally react to an Active Shooter as a lawfully armed citizen is a minimum of seven classes, each 3 to 4-hours in length. 

• One 4-hour class on defense/deadly force law and its aftermath, as well as tactical theory.  
• Four live-fire range sessions, with 1,000 rounds of practice handgun ammo, plus 50 rounds of carry/defensive ammo (to ensure reliability).  This is sufficient to familiarize the new shooter with weapon function and marksmanship capability suitable to hit what they're aiming at on the range at a reasonable distance, from one-foot to 50-yards.  However, it must be emphasized that this may NOT translate to hitting a person at that distance who is shooting at that him in a gunfight).
• Two 4-hour sessions on tactics (500 rounds).  This is fighting from a barricade as well as movement work. 

At the end of 1,550 rounds over a seven to fourteen week period, this person should be capable of going from a non-shooter to someone who is competent in their tactics and marksmanship and may be able to safely disrupt a mass murder event through their skills and tactics. 

MAINTAINING PROFICIENCY

After fundamental marksmanship, tactical, and skills training, the shooter would have to determine the level of proficiency he wishes to maintain.  Firearms proficiency may either be enhanced or degraded with each trigger press in training.  To be of value, training must be conducted with intent to improve the fundamentals with each shot, even during rapid fire, and an understanding of the very real contextual and human factors limitations we all possess.  It is only through conscious training goals and application of effort that any shooter may progress.

With a conscious training plan, that lawfully armed citizen may be able maintain a sufficient degree of proficiency through self-initiated practice.  That practice would include:

• Regular range training.  Approximately 500-1000 rounds per year in a course of fire that included periodic, regular training that focused on fighting skills as well as marksmanship skills.  This training should emphasize functionality and familiarity with your weapon as a fighting tool.
• Mental imaging and preparation.  Playing reasonable "If-Then" games prepares you to respond competently to a suddenly evolving event.  Reading about the situations that occur throughout the world and mentally placing yourself at Ground Zero and then "gaming" possible responses will give you options should you be presented with the real thing. 

No matter how conscious your training practices might be, there will be habits you create that become invisible to you.  Most of these habits will serve you, but others will not.  Allot at least one practice session per year, probably only for one-hour or two, with a competent coach who can observe and correct these invisible habits before they degrade your ability to hit, or worse, get you killed. 

CONTEXT IS KEY 

In every aspect of this discussion, the context must be considered if the answer is to be addressed.  The answer to the question, “How much training do I need if…?” is different for everyone.  The proper response is, “At what level do you want to operate?”  When that “if” is a question about the training necessary to function as a SWAT team operator on an entry team during a hostage rescue, the answer is going to look much different than, “I have a concealed pistol permit, and I want to learn how to better protect myself.  What do I need to learn?” 

As a defensive shooting instructor, it is important to ask questions and determine the practical context of the event we are preparing our students for prior to snapping off a pat answer.  While I am willing to train any lawfully armed citizen to operate their weapons at the highest possible skill and tactical levels, I need to remember that they may not have a clue about what they really want.  It is up to me as the instructor to determine the context of the training course I will suggest to them to meet their needs. 

There are three types of hands-on fights that officers must prepare for.  While every cop has lots of experience going “hands-on” with resisting subjects, you may or may not have experienced all three levels of unarmed suspect resistance.  And this may cost you your life or your health.  The three levels of “fights” officers experience are the scuffle, the determined escape, and THE Fight.  Each varies in intensity, has its own perils and consequences, and each category requires you to quickly orient to your present reality.

The scuffle occurs when a suspect panics at the sudden realization of being under arrest.  Scuffles involve very low-level resistance where the suspect often negotiates or pleads while pushing and/or pulling in a disorganized effort to get away.  The certainty of jail creates a mindless type of flight behavior consisting solely of muscular effort as he frantically seeks to somehow delay the inevitable.  However, panic is not an effective fighting strategy and officers are very familiar with this behavior.  In fact, they are expert in overcoming this type of physical conflict.  Officer injuries in this common force incident are typically strains, sprains, and falls. 

The “determined escape” is less familiar but not altogether surprising.  This involves a suspect who is willing to injure you in order to escape.  This suspect often begins by attempting to pull or push, but unexpectedly escalates to punches, elbows, head-butts, and knees in order to create an opening.  Once you are stunned or injured, this suspect flees.  His purpose for fighting is to escape.  The usual strains, sprains, and falls occur, but the sharp violence from this suspect also brings with it contusions, lacerations, and possible brain injuries ranging from mild to severe concussions.  While not as common as the scuffle, this is a combative experience that is also universal to the police experience.  Too often, as you are struggling to contain the resisting suspect, your first indication of a determined escape is a sudden flash of light accompanied by the pain of being struck.  Surprised, you are knocked back or just lose your grip, and you realize the suspect is already sprinting away.

If you are able, you chase and physically engage him again.  Even though he struck you, you remain reactive as you attempt to overcome his resistance.  At some point you expect him to submit, become fatigued, or be injured sufficiently from your efforts to finally comply.  You understand you are in a fight with someone who will hurt you to get away. 

There is another type of fight that is less common, although, unfortunately, not rare.  The infrequency of this event, in itself, creates a problem for you.  Some officers retire having never been in this fight, while others face it early in their careers.  An arrest goes sideways and you orient to the suspect tensing, pulling, and pushing.  You begin to respond through your usual methods when the suspect suddenly strikes you.  That flash of white, surprise, and loss of grip on the suspect create the space he needs to flee. 

There is another type of fight that is less common, although, unfortunately, not rare.  The infrequency of this event, in itself, creates a problem for you.  Some officers retire having never been in this fight, while others face it early in their careers.  An arrest goes sideways and you orient to the suspect tensing, pulling, and pushing.  You begin to respond through your usual methods when the suspect suddenly strikes you.  That flash of white, surprise, and loss of grip on the suspect create the space he needs to flee. 

Except this time he doesn’t run.  He stays and closes the gap, renewing his assault.

If this is the first time you’ve seen this, you may, like other officers, become confused and disoriented by the suspect’s actions.  Officers are typically stunned, sometimes for critical seconds at this unexpected event.  There is a desperate effort to orient to this change from what should be a familiar pattern, to make sense of this strange situation.  Every other suspect fled the moment there was an opportunity, but this guy is not only staying, he is intent on injuring you.  Frantically attempting to orient to this abrupt difference between the expectation of flight and the unexpected continuation of violence, officers become shocked, mentally locked in place while attempting to make sense of it.  The suspect has achieved two of the three tactical goals:  surprise and violence of action.

Officers in this situation finally recognize the danger and fight back with renewed ferocity in time…or they do not. 

If you are able to fight back, there will likely be a new and unfamiliar determination in your effort—where generally your force is restrained, your response is now definitive.  You may realize the suspect is attempting to cause serious injury, and quickly transition to deadly force.  Or you resort to your own sudden physical violence to overcome this suspect’s murderous intent, employing strikes, throwing the suspect to the ground, or transitioning to a reasonable force tool.

Unfortunately, some officers are unable to orient to this unexpected change.  This is where serious injury is likely to occur.  It is during these seconds of confusion and inability to quickly adapt that officers lose their handguns, are beaten to unconsciousness, or are mortally injured.  The inability to swiftly shift from expected suspect behavior to what is actually happening can fatally delay an effective force response. 

If you have been in this situation, you remember the exact moment.  You remember the suspect’s face, the look of hatred, the confusion you felt when he had an advantage and rather than using it to flee, he stayed to injure you.  And you remember the difference the next time you went hands-on.  While still responding with reasonable force based on the totality of the facts known to you, you no longer played wristy-twisty games.  Instead, your efforts were definitive and designed to gain swift compliance.  You no longer expected the suspect to simply flee after attempting to injure you.  You now take measures not only to stop his flight, but to prevent his ability to harm you because “you’ve been there” and know it was a close call. 

Preparing for THE Fight

A sound survival strategy does not depend upon the luck of the draw, hoping not to be confronted with a suspect who is intent on continuing the fight when he could leave.  There are steps you can take to ensure you are better able to respond.  Enrolling in a quality Mixed Martial Art school, attending more DT classes, and/or getting some one-on-one instruction from your agency instructors can’t hurt.  However, there are other, more valuable preparations you can make.

Expect THE Fight.  If you haven’t experienced THE Fight yet, expect it.  Just knowing about the probability of being surprised by unexpected aggression will provide you with better context for the suspect’s actions when it finally happens.  Humans decisionize under threat through pattern-matching with likely solutions, settling upon the first solution that seems to fit the problem.¹   If you someday expect the suspect to remain and fight, even though every suspect you’ve dealt with has turned and run, it creates an expectation that will help you to more quickly pattern-match and orient to the suspect’s behavior.  You will say, “Oh.  I thought this might happen,” rather than, “What’s going on…what’s he doing?  This never happened before.”  Expecting THE Fight prepares you for that possibility, opening your decision-making options and rapidly recognizing the change in circumstances.  The faster you orient to any fight, especially THE Fight, the more likely you will positively influence the outcome.

Know your force policy and force law.  It is unfortunate that many officers are unsure of when they are permitted to respond with force, including deadly force.  Having been taught only techniques—and sometimes only pressure points to poke at—many officers have never been trained that lawful violence is intrinsic to policing.  Some have been incorrectly trained that punches to the head are either deadly force or excessive force.  Under certain circumstances, deadly force may be lawfully employed against an unarmed suspect given the intensity of a suspect’s threat if that officer can articulate his reasoning. 

There are too many accounts of officers who have been involved in extended fights with suspects, some well-beyond five-minutes, where the officer’s fatigue was so great that defense was no longer possible.  Research shows that officers are functionally unable to continue fighting after just 45-seconds to one-minute of full muscular effort.²   Officers should be trained that deadly force is an option early in this type of incident based on injuries and a high level of fatigue.  Articulating the suspect’s clear determination combined with continuing efforts to seriously harm the officer while having ample opportunity to flee is key to justifying a deadly force response in these circumstances. 

The thorough knowledge of force law and your policies, as well as the ability to articulate your reasonable perceptions and belief of the suspect’s threat, provides you with a confident understanding of the permissions and limits to force.  The question, “Everyone will fight, but will they fight on time?”³  is valid during THE Fight.  “When” is answered in policy and law, and is just as important as “how” in winning any force event. 

Put resisting subjects to the ground immediately!  One of the Universal Rules of Combatives© taught by CUTTING EDGE TRAINING is, “Put resisting subjects to the ground immediately.”©  Suspects who are on their feet retain their systemic body strength as well as their mobility.  Both are threatening to you.  The moment a suspect resists, he should be taken to the ground.  This gives you options, based on the Universal Rule of GroundCombatives©: “Stay if you’re winning, leave if you are losing.”©  Dealing with a suspect on the ground is not a contest.  He is unsearched and his intent unknown.  If you feel you are holding your own and dominating him, by all means stay until he is secured.  But if you believe you are about to be injured, or he is about to gain advantage, it is time to tactically retreat, select the reasonable force tool, and make the decisions you were trained to make based on the law and your policy.  By intentionally taking a suspect to the ground immediately upon the first sign of resistance, it is possible to short cut many suspect’s intentions to harm you.  For those suspects choosing to continue to fight, an intentional takedown will generally leave you standing with the suspect on the ground.  If the fight continues, make your tactical and force decisions from there. 

Conclusion

While every incident where you’ve resorted to DT or experienced a failed Taser discharge has the ability to become THE Fight, a suspect who is willing to stay and fight  when escape may be possible may be a once or twice in a career event.  It’s important to rapidly recognize the unexpected behavior of the suspect.  In all officer safety situations, anything out of the norm means a critical decision-point, and a suspect who is fighting back and can escape but chooses to stay and continue fighting, signals a radical change in normal suspect behavior.  Why he is not fleeing doesn’t matter right now.  The fact that he is still attempting to hurt you does.  Knowing force law gives you permission to respond with reasonable force that will take care of the problem before you are too fatigued to protect yourself.  Putting him to the ground as soon as possible helps to limit his strength and mobility.  Expect THE Fight so you won’t be surprised when it finds you.

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1.    Klein, Gary, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, MIT Press, 1998.
2.    http://www.forcescience.org/fsinews/2011/04/force-science-news-176-final-findings-from-force-science-exhaustion-study/
3.    Clint Smith