Cutting Edge Training

“Since the dawn of time, men have taken up the sword in combat.  Some among them were so capable that they were considered to be in a class of their own—the mighty warrior class.  These men were revered as brave, heroic, and essential to life, for they were the guardians of their people.”   Ben Boos, “Swords”

We are undergoing a curious experiment in North American law enforcement, the effectiveness of which will not likely be known for century, perhaps even more.  The military and the police are our society’s warrior class.  The police (and increasingly the military) are being tasked with performing seemingly conflicting functions, that of being both warrior as well as servant.  Since the beginning of humans gathering into settlements and villages, there have always been people—historically men, and presently both genders—who have taken upon themselves the heavy burden of responsibility as society’s peacemakers, protectors, and guardians.

Until recently (historically), and especially prior to the 1970s, these individuals acting in the name of the law have been fairly unrestrained in their violence.  Law breakers, especially violent criminals could expect “frontier justice,” and, later, “street justice,” as a result of their behavior.  It was “understood” by both parties that if you were arrested, there was oftentimes a beating due before you went to jail.  When I was a child, I grew up in a county where the jail would not accept a prisoner who was not bleeding.

Thankfully, times have changed.  In our maturing society, officers are now expected to be “peace officers.”  This experiment continues to unfold into a combination of roles, that of “public servant” and “officer” (keeper of the peace, or warrior).  These roles sometimes appear to be at odds especially in the brutal laboratory of the street where policing actually takes place.  As public servants under the US Constitution, officers are first tasked with preserving the civil rights of the individuals with whom they come into official contact, and then to assist those in need. 

This has evolved into even greater demands for professional courtesy when interacting with the public.  As the responsibilities of policing expand well beyond simply enforcing the law, there are greater expectations by at least some segments of society for officers to “help” individuals—even those who are violent and may harm the officers. 

This evolving role is mirrored in the character of those individuals wearing the badge:  officers generally become cops because they want to be of service, and this quality is indispensable in the mindset of a police officer.  In recent years, however, this message of “service” has become misunderstood by many officers to be their primary mission.  When these officers arrive “on-scene,” their first instinct is “to help” rather than to ensure their safety and the safety of all through enforcement efforts first, and service when all are safe.

If you are this officer, this primary attitude of being "helpful" can get you—and others—murdered.

“Looking for a Fight”

These competing roles can be resolved through a mindset reflecting the reality of current policing requirements:  “always look for a fight.”

The phrase, “looking for a fight” can be construed many ways.  Warriors in past ages constantly sought every opportunity for combat as a means to prove their valor and skill.  Those warriors without a commitment to higher ideals of service and integrity were dangerous to anyone on whom they focused as a threat or challenger, creating the need for a competing class of warriors who sought to protect.  Today, in the civilian world, the phrase can mean that a particular person wants to engage in violence and is simply looking for any excuse, often creating the opportunity where none existed.  However, neither of these interpretations are the context for modern day law enforcement.  

Properly understood, the officer today would embody the following phrase and underlying mindset in his or her awareness of suspect behavior and signaled intentions:

“I always look for a fight.  Don’t get me wrong.  While I’m willing, I don’t want to get into a fight.  But I’m always looking for signs that someone on-scene wants to fight.  It’s the only way I can be ready to respond when the fight comes while still doing my job of helping people.”

This modern concept of “looking for a fight” is key to not only every officer’s safety on the street, but also to protecting the citizens the officer serves.  It does NOT conflict with the function of the police as both protector and servant, rather it enhances the service function and safety of all.  “Relaxing” may mean letting one’s guard down and is not useful.  “Looking for a fight,” however, permits the officer to act “in service” with professionalism and appropriate courtesy until a subject’s behavior or the circumstances necessitate enforcement, defensive, or protective responses. 

Officers properly should “look for a fight” so that they can be ready to respond to sudden assault or flight.  “Looking for a fight” simply means that from minutes prior to arrival on-scene to the moment after you have cleared the call, you are consciously looking for those behaviors and clues signaling impending attack or flight.  Like it or not, officer injury and murder statistics demonstrate that officers have a real need to capably respond with lawful violence to any level of assault.  Understanding your proper role as an officer, looking for a fight is the difference between being:

• Ready to respond early with effective and reasonable force, or 
• Being surprised and being forced to “come from behind”—or even forced to “go primitive” to save your life.
  

 When consciously looking for a fight, an officer is not heavy-handed, rude, or badge heavy.  This proper mindset is not a predator’s world-view—it is that of a public servant who has a warrior’s mindset.  It is based in a thorough understanding of law and agency policy, and the understanding that violence is a process rather than a simple, contained event.

Your job as a cop carries with it the inherent and lawful threat of violence.  For your safety (and that of the citizens you serve), you must embrace this warrior function.  Developing your skills with weapons (less-lethal and deadly) and with empty hands is only part of the equation.  Looking for a fight means recognizing the process of violence as it cycles up to an attack (or attempt to flee) early enough to prevent injury.

Violence is a Process

Violence does not just happen.  All violence is a process.  It moves from the beginning of an idea through to its final execution up to the conclusion of the violent act(s).  Aside from planned ambushes where officers have no inkling of prior threat (which still involved the suspect initiating a process of decision-making, implementation, and initiation), there are generally many indicators of a growing likelihood of assault or an attempt to flee.  Any officer who says the suspect “just attacked me without any warning” probably missed a cascading number of indicators that the offender made a decision, initiated preparations (either subtle or gross), and then executed his plan.  

The decision to assault may have taken place prior to the police contact (a “prepared offender”), or it may be a spur of the moment decision based on panic (an “opportunistic offender”).  In the case of the prepared offender, the threat indicators as he maneuvers into his assault preparatory position are likely to be more subtle than the opportunistic offender’s desperate spur of the moment realization that he needs to attack the officer or he’ll go to jail.  Subtle or not, there are indicators exhibited that, if recognized early enough, will provide the officer with a justifiable basis for a pre-emptive force response.  The early recognition, early enough to make a difference is a direct benefit of the mindset of “looking for a fight.”

Because violence doesn’t just happen, officer safety is dramatically enhanced through vigilance and the early recognition of threat indicators; this is what it means to be "looking for a fight."  This includes the totality of the facts before arriving in the area, as well as those observed upon arrival, and individual or group signals of impending threat.

Totality of the Facts:  Before Arriving On-Scene

Upon any dispatch to an incident, begin “looking for a fight.”

Violence in the initial dispatched report, or the presence of weapons may very well indicate there will be a “fight.”  The same can be said in any contact involving a subject who is a member of a gang, or a history of violence, especially against the police.  Certain types of behavior indicating out of control mental illness or being under the influence of drugs such as methamphetamine or PCP may indicate unpredictable violence.

The initial call for service initiates the “best-worst game.”  The “best-worst game” assists you in keeping an open mind, permitting the appropriate function (warrior or public servant) to present as needed and as reasonable for the circumstances.  Ask yourself while en-route, “What’s the best thing that can happen, and what’s the worst?”  Play the game each time you are dispatched or are backing an officer to get your head in the game well before you near the scene.

Make up your own scenarios.  Do you know the players in this call?  Whatever the scenario, develop a “when-then” response.  “When ‘this’ happens, I’ll respond by…”  Notice it is not “if,” but “when.”  Feel the difference in your mind and body between the two following phrases:

• “If the suspect has a gun, I’ll…”
• “When the suspect has a gun, I’ll”

For most people, “when” makes it more real, more likely to occur, and provides a better “go-switch” should some assault take place.  “If” seems more remote, and feels much less likely to occur.  “When” tells us it is going to happen at some point; “If” is the lottery that will probably pass us by.  “When” is inevitable; “If” will likely never happen.

Taking into account your knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the location, the reported participants, and the “known” circumstances (accounting for the fact that what is reported to Dispatch may or may not resemble what actually occurred), begin looking for a fight.  What is the safest way to respond to this location given the threat (and what can go wrong before I get there)? 

Determine the safest method of approach to the location to achieve “invisible deployment” and surprise.  Coordinating with other responding officers to arrive simultaneously from different directions, or meeting at a rally point and moving together are options that can be applied for safer responses.  It is during these beginning stages of responding to a call for service that “looking for a fight” begins.

Totality of the Facts:  Arriving On-Scene

As you approach the location, look for a fight.  Is there anything out of the ordinary?  Is the street deserted where it is normally busy?  Is there an angry crowd milling about, or is there fear showing in individuals’ physical or emotional behavior?  Are people urgently attempting to get your attention, pointing at an individual or to a location?  Is a person or group of persons exhibiting guilty, threatening, defiant, under-the-influence or mentally ill behavior focusing your attention on them?

Whether it is appropriate to employ stealth or not in your approach is situation-dependent; looking for a fight is not.  What is the entire scene telling you?  Even if there is an obvious victim, your first instinct should be to look for a fight—you have no idea who harmed the victim, where that subject is, and what the victim’s intention is toward the police.  

LOCK DOWN THE SCENE as quickly as possible to ensure the safety of all.  Rushing up to “help” the victim may put you into proximity with an opportunistic offender who may use this lapse in officer safety practices to harm you to ensure his escape, or put you directly into a kill zone.  The best way to “help” this victim is to ensure that no one else, and especially you and other officers, are harmed in the attempt.  

Individual Contacts

When contacting any individual, suspect, witness, uninvolved party, or victim, look for a fight.  You know what cooperative behavior looks like, having seen it constantly since you were first in uniform, knowing what people who comply act like.  You also know how evasive or uncooperative behavior looks.  While evasiveness or a lack of cooperation does not equal assault, it IS an indicator that should not be dismissed and is almost always a component in any forensic analysis of an assault on an officer.  It is part of looking for a fight, narrowing down your focus to the evasive or non-cooperative individual, identifying someone who may want to harm you.

Threat indicators are generally based on behavior that has in the past been observed prior to assault.  These are divided into four main groups:  Motor Activity, Attitude Patterns, Posture, and Speech, or M.A.P.S.  An extremely limited examination of components within the various threat indicators of the M.A.P.S. model are:

Motor Activity:

• Clenching jaw and fists, flexing arm, chest, and shoulder muscles repeatedly.
• Striking objects in the officer’s presence.
• Rapid, out-of-control breathing.
  

 Attitude Pattern:

• Extreme distrust.
• Controlled anger.
• Repeatedly failing to comply with simple instructions.
  

 Posture:

• Excessive eye-contact or "mad-dogging."
• Maneuvering into a bladed stance or overt “fighting stance.”
• Maneuvering to “protect” his dominant side from the officer. 

Speech Patterns:

• Quiet but “pushed” speech, or talking through his clenched teeth. 
• Answering questions with questions, or repeating back the officer’s words.
• Statements of “losing control” or past violence.

An almost universal signal the suspect has elected to engage in violence is what is described as a look of “disgust” immediately prior to the assault.  Injuring or murdering another who the individual perceives as a fellow “human being” is difficult.  He therefore enters into a process of “othering” the officer, making that person other than human in his mind, as if that person is simply an object to be used.  Disgust exhibited at this time in this confrontation is a physical manifestation of his being disgusted, offended, and concluding an internal mental process of dehumanizing the officer.  It is at that moment the suspect has decided to initiate the now imminent attack.

While one of these behaviors may mean nothing in and of itself (the look of disgust is the exception), it is generally a cluster of M.A.P.S. threat indicators combined with the totality of the events that should signal a tactical or force response.  Looking at your own experience with resistive or assaultive behavior, list mentally the four M.A.P.S. threat indicator categories exhibited by the last five suspects who forced you to respond with force.  While the concept of “threat indicators” may not be new to you, utilizing the MAPS model and breaking each observed behavior into its category not only makes you more likely to notice the behavior on the street, but better enables your articulation during any justification following a force response. 

Looking for Predatory Behavior

Predatory behavior in humans matches anything seen by lions, tigers, and bears on the Animal Planet channel.  These are easy to see if you are looking for a fight:

• One or more people intercepting your path. 
• Two or more people intentionally spreading out in a flanking move, widening the angle between them.
• Knowing glances or subtle agreement between two or more people that seems to initiate movement or some action. 
• “Flooding” by multiple suspects seeking to suddenly surround you.  This is seen when a car full of subjects suddenly exits as if upon agreement, seemingly a swarm of bodies, or like a flood that will overwhelm you.

Whether or not you were looking for a fight, any single factor or a combination of these predatory behaviors means you just found one. 

Non-Compliance to Simple Orders

Any non-compliance by any suspect is threat indicator.  An indicator that an individual is near to completing the decision process to physically engage (or flee) is the direct refusal to comply with simple directions to “Step over here to me;” “Keep your hands where I can see them;” “Sit down on the curb,” or any order directly related to your safety.

Asking yourself, “Why isn’t he complying?” is a waste of limited attentional focus.  Why he isn’t cooperating is secondary to what he is doing while he is not complying.  Wondering "why?" rather than "what?" can get you murdered.  Is he:

• Seemingly looking for escape routes?
• Subconsciously guarding his dominant side, touching the outside of his pocket(s) or waistband? 
• Glancing repeatedly at your holstered handgun or other weapon(s) rather than cooperate?
• Seeming to be attempting to maneuver to gain some type of positional advantage despite orders to the contrary?
• Subtly blading his body or transferring his body weight to the balls of his feet (which can appear as if he’s crouching a bit)?
• Rocking his body weight to his back foot so he can step forward with his other to initiate the assault (punch, tackle, takedown, etc.)?
• A subject who will not comply with police orders is engaged in a risk-benefit evaluation process:  “Is it worth the risk to me to fight or run from the cop versus the dope/weapon/ warrant/crime I just committed he’ll find if I cooperate with him?” 
  

Be Safe:  Look for a Fight

Far from being an abusive mindset and a recipe for excessive force, constantly “looking for a fight” permits an officer to safely do his (or her) job while being of service to those who need the police.  Approaching any call with a social worker’s mentality is unsafe for everyone on-scene.  Yes, officers are there to assist, to protect those who cannot protect themselves, and to act as a shield against those who criminally harm others.  Part of that function is intrinsically violent because some criminals just won’t listen to reason and will respond only to threats of or actual violence.

When and how that force is employed, as a reasonable response to suspect behavior, will be determinant of your ability to protect yourself and others.  Officers who are suddenly overwhelmed by sudden, unexpected violence have little chance to defend themselves from harm or murder.  The mindset begins at the first moment of being notified of a call for service.  The “looking for a fight” mentality is carried through early orientation to suspect threat cues, predatory behavior, and non-compliance to simple, direct orders to prevent you from being assaulted.

As the civil guardian of our society, the police officer has sworn an oath, picked up the sword, and has become essential to our society.   We expect more of our officers than ever before, more than the "rough men who stand ready in the night willing to do violence to those who would do us harm" of George Orwell, more than we expected of the officers in our father's generation.  Within the course of your business day, you will encounter few who are actually willing to harm you--they may not like the job you do, but they are not willing to do the deed.  Among everyone you meet on your shift, you may recognize those few, the one or two on that particular call who are willing to engage in the Process of Violence.  That recognition early enough, gives you the opportunity to foul their plans, and hopefully to bypass the violence through your own tactical movement and early intervention.   If you are among those who are most capable at their profession, your mindset is to simply, consistently, and constantly “look for a fight” as you protect the public and yourself from injury or murder. 

A rash of shootings of off-duty officers occurred over the last few months.  These officers were tragically shot and killed by other police officers responding to reports of violence (generally shootings or man-with-a-gun calls).  This is not, unfortunately, an unusual series of events.  The shooting of off-duty or plainclothes officers is all too common.  These shootings almost universally occurred as these brave professionals were involved in off-duty enforcement actions—primarily in responding to imminent threat to life events with deadly force against the actual suspects.  Responding officers mistook their armed status, firing at what they reasonably believed to be a dangerous suspect.

Each time there is a shooting of an off-duty officer, there is a call for a nationwide “universal system of identifying off-duty officers” who are taking enforcement action.  The idea of identifying off-duty cops is difficult at best as most do not want to be identified as “police” as they move about their off-duty hours, and carrying indentifying clothing or markers (which can be pulled on or revealed) gets old after a very short period of time.  It is unlikely that officers will become excited about anything like these suggestions.  Something else must be sought as a more practical solution.

Are Off-Duty Officers More Likely to be Mistakenly Shot Than Civilians When They Intervene?

Given the number of off-duty officers who are shot, and the number who are killed, a question arises:  Are civilians who are licensed to carry a concealed handgun and are, like officers also permitted by law to intervene in deadly assaults (by right of self-defense and defense of others), also being shot in corresponding numbers by responding police?  After all, there are many more concealed carry permit holders nationwide than officers, and these people intervene in violent acts at a greater rate than police officers (According to researcher John Lott, there are approximately 3.6 million defensive uses of a firearm by civilians per year in the US, of which 98% are merely brandishing a weapon to discourage criminal assault.  The remaining 72,000 defensive uses of a gun involve the individual firing in self-defense or defense of others.).

A search of the internet reveals the usual anti-gun sites listing crimes committed by a very few permit holders, but otherwise there is very little mention of police officers shooting civilians in the act of lawfully intervening in a violent event.  Why this difference between the two groups of individuals who are both in civilian clothes and armed with a firearm while engaging in similar intervention tasks?

In considering the number and circumstances of these shootings, it becomes plainly apparent that a two-pronged solution for police is necessary if we hope to change the number and frequency of these “blue-on-blue/friendly fire” shootings:

• Off-duty conduct during the act of intervention; AND,
• Current deadly force training.

Off-Duty Police Conduct and Intervention

Off-duty conduct has been addressed in training for years:

• Take enforcement action only in defense of life.
• Be a good wit.
• If you draw a weapon, get your police ID out and visible.
• When the officers arrive, DO WHAT THEY TELL YOU TO DO.

The unspoken problem with this? Cops have “cop mentality” and see other cops from their own perspective—an off-duty or plainclothes officer sees or hears responding officers and thinks, "Here comes MY team."  What happens when you are on-duty, in uniform or a raid jacket, and your team members arrive when you need help?  Some part of you relaxes a bit and you now begin to think and act like you are part of the arriving officers' team.  You are not alone.  You have support and assistance and your danger level just decreased immensely from what it was just moments before because your teammates will protect you.  You might begin thinking, “We are going to take care of the rest of this event.”

This is 180 degrees from the off-duty’s present reality—the arriving officers see a gun and think, "Suspect with a gun!”  Minimally, at gunpoint, the uniform begins shouting repeated orders to drop the gun, to get on the ground, to show hands, etc.  When the man-with-a-gun (the actor) is shooting at the other individual (victim) or is pointing a gun at the other subject (victim), the uniformed officer responds per his or her training or experience. 

With the off-duty officer completely snapped into his “cop-perspective,” he hears the orders he has heard hundreds of times on-duty.  He’s shouted them to suspects hundreds of times.  Once officers get to this point in a contact, they almost always have won and the suspect almost universally complies.  The off-duty is further lulled into a sense of safety.  His teammates are simply acting out their roles along with him—and certainly not against him.

Now the off-duty officer turns to greet the team.  The stress and fear from the previous course of events as well as the continuing level of danger are still on his face.  The weapon moves because the off-duty officer’s head moves toward the arriving officer(s). 

The on-duty, uniformed officer, with no information other than the original call of unknown violence or that a shooting has taken place, sees the man-with-a-gun turning at him.  Perception-response limitations and the certain knowledge that the uniform is “behind” in this gunfight act on the officer’s training and survival instinct.  He responds to a reasonably perceived threat, "He's moving at me!—SHOOT!!!!!"

These "blue-on-blue, friendly fire" shootings occur because, as officers arrive, the off-duty cop, thinking like a cop who is one of the team, acts like one of the team, and turns, fails to comply with immediate orders, or is simply shot down because he's in the act of firing on someone—or more commonly, holding a subject at gunpoint and turning with a gun in his hand to look at the officers.

TRAINING POINT:  Off-duty tactical and survival strategies are different than on-duty, uniformed or easily identifiable methods of performing the job.

• Think of the responding officers from the perspective of the most excitable and impulsive officer you've ever worked with.  What is s/he going to see and how is s/he going to be processing high-threat, time-compressed events when you are shooting at someone or standing over someone with a handgun in-hand?  That ought to make you fairly concerned about your safety as the cavalry arrives, and VERY compliant to any orders.

“Off-Duty Officer Safety” Suggestions

Take enforcement action only in defense of life, and be a good witness.  The common arguments for not taking routine enforcement actions remain viable:  you are not equipped like you are on-duty, you do not have communications capabilities like you do on-duty, you have no backup, no one is checking on you if you don’t report in, and no one knows where you are.

TRAINING POINT:  In this case, there is no reason to get involved in thefts, arguments, simple assaults, strong-arm robberies, etc., without extenuating circumstances (purse snatch: no;  beat down robbery:  probably).  Absent a threat-to-life-assault, with or without weapons, become the best witness you can.  While some officers believe they have a “duty” to intervene under any circumstances involving any infraction or crime, a more mature view is that being a witness and safely tracking the whereabouts or flight of the suspect(s), permitting on-duty uniformed officers to converge and apprehend and later prosecute the suspect(s) is still performing your duty without needlessly endangering your life or that of the responding officers. 

If you draw a weapon, get your police ID out and visible simultaneously.  Many officers carry a badge on a chain around their necks under their shirts, ready to flip outside of their clothing to be “visible” to all around them.  Others wear their badge next to their holstered weapon so that all who see the holstered weapon can see the badge and “know” they are officers.  Still others carry their badges in either their sole wallet or a second wallet, and pull it out and flip the badge open in their reactive hand to be “seen” simultaneously with the drawn handgun.

TRAINING POINT:  The problem is an arriving officer’s attentional focus will likely be locked onto the handgun and s/he will likely not be able to see anything other than that threat.  Absent a uniform or raid jacket, the arriving officer’s attention set (what s/he expects to see) is a civilian acting like a criminal with a gun.  Police trainers train officers to have this attention set, and most of the time it is the proper mindset and expectation.  NEVER RELY ON A BADGE TO PROTECT YOU FROM MISIDENTIFICATION BY OFFICERS EXPECTING A CRIMINAL.  With that said, ALWAYS, if it is practicable, have your badge visible, but don’t depend upon an officer seeing it in time.

When the officers arrive, do what they tell you to do.  See from the perspective of the arriving officers.  When you hear orders, understand that even if they see your badge, anybody can buy and display a badge.

TRAINING POINT:  Follow any police commands as if the orders were directed at you.  If ordered to the ground, do it slowly.  If ordered to drop your weapon, do it (don’t carry a gun that you don’t want to drop on the ground—carrying a customized, one-of-a-kind gun that you don’t want to ding is stupid:  everyday carry will ding and rub the finish anyway, so either don’t carry it or drop it when commanded so you don’t get shot).  DO yell that you are a cop.  DO have your badge/ID visible.  Then comply with every command until someone says, “No, not you.”  And you may be cuffed—comply, even if you wouldn’t handcuff someone who said he was a cop (Now is the time to thank the nice police officer for not shooting you rather than getting in his face because he “treated me like a crook!”  Save your moral outrage and comply like you hope another professional would if the tables were turned and you were uniform who was simply attempting to be safe while trying to figure out “who’s who in the zoo.”).

Nothing changes in your jurisdiction.  Just because you are in your jurisdiction where you are well known and know every officer in the agency, you cannot assume they will recognize you.  The attentional focus under stress cannot be switched on and off.  If there is a great degree of perceived threat, the likelihood of your being recognized by someone you have worked with for years is low to non-existent.  A tragic but extremely useful example is from California where an officer in an agency with 24 officers is changing from his uniform to civilian clothing at the end of shift.  An Emotionally Disturbed Person brandishes a handgun in the station lobby.  The off-duty officer, now in civilian clothes, circles around to the front of the station, gun in hand, to support the responding officers.  Officers confront the suspect from the Records doorway, pointing handguns and yelling orders.  After a minute or so, the suspect, still armed with the handgun, begins to count down while at gunpoint, "Ten; Nine; Eight; Seven..."  Uniformed officers fire when he reaches "Two," hitting him and ending the threat.  As they approach the downed gunman, the off-duty officer pushes open the door and quickly enters the lobby to assist in taking the suspect into custody.  An officer calls out, “Gun!”  The two officers spin and shoot the man-with-a-gun, the officer who was off-duty, a man they had just gotten off shift with.  He died, leaving a wife and son.

He was shot because these officers, under this level of stress, threat, and time compression, were humanly able to see only the gun, and from that, both officers made their simultaneous survival decision.  Now, try to tell the two shooter officers that they couldn’t have done anything differently under the circumstances—it’s doubtful they have yet forgiven themselves for shooting and killing their co-worker, their friend, even though it clearly was not their fault.

Deadly Force Training

Many officer survival and firearms training programs emphasize recognition of the weapon as the trip-wire for response.  This is offered as “Gun = shoot.”  “Knife = shoot.”  The signal to shoot on the range is, "Gun!"  Knife defense deadly force signal, "Knife!"

TRAINING POINT:  Deadly force should be a behavior-based response rather than a simple response to the hardware an individual possesses.  Training should provide what I call "Early Orientation Markers" which provide threat pattern-matching capabilities for officers.  It is the concept of “threatening behavior + reasonable belief of capability (weapon) = Deadly Force.

"Deadly force” is permitted when an officer has a reasonable and objective belief that his/her life, or that of another’s, is in actual or imminent danger of death or serious physical injury (SPI) based on the totality of the facts known to the officer at the time."  While this discussion is not intended to be a primer on deadly force standards, the individual officer’s reasonable belief the suspect’s actions, based on everything known to the officer at that moment, creating an imminent (about to shoot) or actual (the subject is firing) danger of being killed or seriously injured is required.  The mere possession of a deadly weapon absent any other indication of threat (past threat such as in an active shooter event, or an imminent threat such as moving the weapon toward or at the officer, arming himself, etc.) is difficult to justify.  If the suspect is simply armed, the officer should likely need more information to shoot.

A first responding sergeant at the Trolley Square Mall shooting (an active shooter event) stated he  (the sergeant did not fire on the off-duty officer because of the officer’s behavior—though the plainclothes, off-duty was armed with a weapon in-hand and was maneuvering in a tactical manner, the sergeant instantly understood that the armed individual was not a problem (Source:  Steve Papenfuhs).  Simply put, the off-duty officer was not acting in manner that prompted his needing to be shot.  That sergeant’s instant evaluation in a high-threat environment is the behavior-based decision-making that I believe we need to reinforce in training.  Our job is to create in our officers a capability of evaluating threat behavior very quickly:  “Is the behavior I see right now like a criminal (threatening) or like a cop (protective even though tactical)?

Officers responding to high risk calls (man-with-a-gun qualifies) need to have proper tactics drilled into them in training.  As, or even more importantly, peer pressure and supervisory reinforcement of safe and practical application of tactical movement and response should be never-ending.  Proper tactics provide officers the time they need to evaluate the situation and to react to the threat-based behavior rather than simply the hardware they need to focus on when there is no time left but to react.

TRAINING POINT:  Good tactical response according to Universal Tactical Principles© creates time to make these decisions:

• Optimize distance.  Stay as far from the suspected problem as you can and still be able to conduct business.  Distance equals time.  While the “optimum” distance is a subjective matter that must balance efficiency and effectiveness with safety, generally the farther you can get from a weapon problem, more time is available enabling to you to operate safely.
• Minimize exposure.  Be as small a target as possible.  Cover stops bullets and the effects of bullets (ricochet and spall from the backside of the material) from harming you.  Concealment prevents observation but not bullets passing through.  All approaches to high-risk, weapon-related calls should be from cover to cover.  All contact with armed/possibly armed-subjects should be from cover or concealment.  Cover is your friend when you have a firearm in your hand. 
• Invisible deployment.  Officers should deploy on-scene unobtrusively and reveal their presence at a time and timing of their choosing.  The subject(s) should be surprised to find an officer pointing a weapon at them, rather than anticipating where and when the officer will be revealed.
• Keep subjects in a narrow field of view.  If you are part of a multiple-officer response, your objective is to contact the subject(s) from positions providing a wide triangulation for you and your fellow officers, giving you intersecting fields of fire as well as a narrow target.  When combined with the Universal Tactical Principle of “invisible deployment,” this method of contact creates an instant, extreme vulnerability for the suspect.  Essentially, it “flanks” the suspect and gives him wide and divergent angles in order to get firing solutions on each officer—a very difficult and unlikely proposition.

Conclusion

The shooting of off-duty or plainclothes officers is, largely, avoidable.  The solution primarily centers on both sides of the problem, the off-duty officer as well as the responding officer.

Responding officers must be trained to respond to life-threatening behavior rather than to a weapon.  By employing Universal Tactical Principles© within the response, the officer gains more time for decision-making while increasing their own safety.  “Getting the drop” on the suspect is a good thing (like being behind "cover" when you have a weapon in your hand).

Off-duty safety in the past has centered on training the off-duty officer to act like a police officer.  When intervening in a criminal act, the off-duty officer was to “clearly” identify himself, take action, and then cooperate with the officers to take the subject into control.  But this almost universally trained strategy continues to end in tragedy.

While not empirical by any means, it is likely that off-duty officers snap into their regular enforcement mindset while for the armed civilian this is an unusual event.  When the civilian draws his weapon and engages a suspect by fire, this is strictly a surreal situation that is altogether different from any experience he might have had prior to the shooting.  When the police arrive on-scene, while there is likely a sense of relief, the armed civilian knows he is not on the “cops’ team.”  The officers don’t know him at all, and may treat him like a threat.  Paying attention and complying is the best path.

A shooting might well be a novel experience for an officer as well.  However, the officer will be well-conditioned by his experience of policing, confronting suspects, and taking subjects into custody to revert to accustomed behavior.  Add to this any scenario-based training involving the officer responding to threat with deadly force.  Moreover, officers are used to working as a team, and have that schema, or mental map, that filters their perceptions.  It is a rare officer who has not contemplated the very real possibility of being involved in an officer-involved shooting--and it is likely the officer personally knows one or several officers who have been in shootings.  This also adds to the “cop mindset” that officers bring to their off-duty interventions.

Acting like an officer when not clearly and immediately identifiable as a cop is a tactical choice that is inherently hazardous in the face of responding officers rushing to the scene of what they know only as a crime in-progress involving a firearm.  If being a witness is not an option, make a conscious decision to act in a manner that protects you from being shot by a cop who either doesn't or cannot recognize you as a "good guy," and take steps before the police arrive on-scene to lessen the chance of friendly fire.  If confronted, immediately respond the same way you hope a suspect will act when you get the drop on him.

While these tragic shootings may never be eliminated, I believe it is possible to limit their frequency through training both sides of this terrible equation. 

Take care, be safe.  And shoot straight.

So much has been written, talked about, and trained about the subject of police response to the “Active Shooter” (AS).  For years advocates of the “formation” have brooked no dissent and have held that the formation (whatever particular formation they have emotionally bought into) is the only method of training and responding because nothing else is “safe.”  These formations are complicated affairs with strict fields of fire that must be maintained while moving in a chaotic environment.  So little has actually been proven regarding this training in the real world that these claims—and the training that has resulted in the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of personnel hours—must be considered extravagant and ultimately wasteful.

I believe, as we have seen in the real-world of police responses to AS events, that the limited-number officer response is fundamentally the most successful doctrine we have available.  Solo officers have isolated the AS and limited additional carnage to innocents, ending the event either through their own gunfire or by motivating the suspect to initiate his/her end-game of suicide-in-place.  There has not, as yet, been a lot of room clearing during the event while it is still evolving.  There has been a lot of running to the sound of gunfire and then maneuvering for a shot.  None, that I know of, has involved a response by formation to an active event where there has been interdiction to a suspect who was currently engaged in murdering others.

Formations?  Not-so-much.

A little history of the various formations is important before moving into a discussion of street reality.  All of the various formations—the diamond, the “T,” the “Inverted V,” and others—are modifications or directly taken from the military.  The proponents point to the fact that if the military continues to teach these formations, they have intrinsic value.

The context in which these “formations” are valuable should be the only interest for those evaluating how to respond to an Active Shooter (a term Jeff Martin and I coined in 1999).  Each of these formations were developed and useful for crossing a large open area where it is unknown if there are hostile forces, and a large number of personnel are involved in the movement.  Dispersion (distance between personnel) is maintained to minimize casualties, and sectors of fire are established to increase the detection of the enemy and to prevent blue-on-blue (friendly fire) shootings.

The current requirement of a “tail-gunner” is a recent law enforcement development that resulted not from a real event, but from the creative imagination of two SWAT cops during a training scenario.  These two “suspects” hatched plans about how “they would do it.”  While one of the “suspects” kept the formation’s attention, the other circled around by climbing through the ceiling and duct work, and took the officers in the formation by surprise from behind.  The boogey-man was created, and thus was born the need for a tail-gunner.

The misapplication of these formations—inside a building with officers bunched up—has now been taught to most officers.  This formation training, with its needless, theoretical, and historically redundant tail-gunner, is too slow and inefficient to deal with the real-world demands of an AS event.  The theory is that the officers wait until a sufficient number arrive on-scene.  Quickly forming up, they move as a group with each member maintaining his/her field of fire.  As they pass a room, the formation collapses to permit clearing of that room through entry by two or more personnel.  Clearing that room, the formation is reformed and moves to the next doorway, where it is then cleared.  Meanwhile, the gunfire continues, and more innocents are butchered.

Bunching up creates a bigger target.  Believing that “firepower” will protect the members of formation only shows that this concept has not been thought through.  Officers will mask other officer's weapons, creating "friendly fire" problems or preventing officers from being able to fire.  While more personnel have more weapons and theoretically more “firepower,” each weapon (actually, each pair of eyes controlling a weapon) in the formation is not immediately pointing at the suspect’s position as he emerges from his position.  Each officer will require many long tenths of a second to orient that he is under fire, where that fire is coming from, overcome their surprise and fright, decide that a response is needed, what that response looks like, how not to shoot his/her partner, and then execute that response to the threat.  Meanwhile, the suspect is able to immediately shoot (he has no target discrimination requirements, so he doesn’t take a half-second determining “if” he should shoot or not), and then able to put out one round every two-tenths of a second into the group of the officers standing in a bunch just yards away.  So a more realistic timeline is:

• If an officer is looking at the suspect as he emerges and levels the weapon at the group of officers and fires; and,
• If that first officer is switched on and extremely well-trained, that first officer will return fire within approximately one-half second due to target discrimination requirements and natural human time requirements in processing changes in the status quo of his environment.  In the meanwhile, the suspect is firing an average of five rounds per second at the officers; and,
• If the other officers are able to overcome their surprise and have not yet been seriously injured by the suspect’s fire, they will likely return fire within three-quarters to one-second of the suspect’s first firing—after four to five rounds fired by the suspect into the group of officers; and,
• If the suspect is hit by the first officer’s round and if the suspect is unable or unwilling to continue firing, then he will have likely fired only two or three rounds into the group of officers; but,
• If the first officer misses and the suspect is able to continue to fire for a second-and-a-half to two-seconds, he will have fired seven to ten rounds into the group of officers standing in a group.

A key factor of actual Active Shooter (non-hostage) shootings: it has been estimated that from the first shot until the last shot in any of these events, one person is murdered for every fifteen seconds that the shooter is permitted the freedom to continue hunting and killing his victims.  We now have a tragic track record, with a sufficient number of events having taken place to gain some insight as to how they unfold.  In an average event, if responding officers wait for a sufficient number of officers (four to five), organize and form up, and then move in formation toward the suspect, the murders of innocents will already be well under way or over, well before any of these officers can intervene.

Formation training is a waste of time and expense.  It unproven in the real world, and is unlikely to perform as advertised.  It is an unsafe and misapplied technique in an environment that requires speed, agility and flexibility of tactics, as well as aggressive action to limit the rapidly accumulating loss of life experienced in these events.

Immediate Response to the Active Shooter

Ideally, two officers will respond within seconds of each other to the scene, permitting them to team up and move to the sound of gunfire.  Ideally they will employ “traveling overwatch” until they believe they are close to the shooter, and then transition to bounding overwatch as they get closer to the danger, bypassing any open or closed doors.  As soon as one of the officers sees the shooter, and if it is apparent that individual is intent on continuing to murder others, the officer should immediately shoot the suspect without warning.  The second officer should maneuver into position to provide cover for the first officer from any unknown threat (a possible second shooter)—“Contact and Cover” principles always apply. The officers should, if possible, contact the shooter while separated as widely as possible, providing interlocking fields of fire. 

However, upon arrival of the first officer to the scene of an Active Shooter, an extended ETA for a second officer of even 30 seconds is unacceptable and signals the need for a “Solo Response.”

The initial responding officer (for the balance of this discussion, I will use the male pronoun, with no disrespect intended for female officers) should deploy from his vehicle parked as close to the entry point as possible (while guarding against as many lines of threat as possible) and will approach from the most protected path of ingress.  Armed with a shoulder weapon (ideally a red dot-equipped rifle) and as much ammo as possible (three magazines in a Mumbai/Beslan event will last about one-minute), ballistic vest (should be already worn), a ballistic helmet, clear protective eye-wear (e.g. ESS ballistic eye-wear), and breaching equipment (bolt cutters and some type of hooligan tool, e.g., Benchmade’s Model 172 “Tomahawk”), entry should be made.

If the sound of gunfire can be heard, the officer should carefully and swiftly move toward it—run to the sound of gunfire—keeping cover and concealment options between him and the apparent origin of fire.  There will be the dead and dying.  All injured or dead should be bypassed—they will be cared for by follow-on assets.  There is one mission:  safely interdict the suspect(s) and stop the killing.  As the officer perceives he is nearing the suspect’s location, rapid movement is replaced with cautious aggression.  By this time, it is likely that nearly everyone without a gun has gone to ground and is attempting to get very, very small and hidden.  People are going to be cowering, and taking the chance to exit only if it seems safe to do so.  Parents will be desperately shushing their children.  A crowded area may initially seem almost deserted.

Communicate your position and progress as it is safe to do so.  The radio can be your friend, but your weapons and tactics will save your life.  Stay off the radio unless you have something you need others to know about the situation that will help you survive and prevail over the shooter.

Open doors or store fronts should be bypassed quickly while moving and shots are still being fired.  This is a variation of the “Forget the Boogey-man” Theory.  While many authorities insist that each room or area must be searched and cleared to prevent being attacked from behind, the responding solo officer should forget about the boogey-men that could possibly be hidden along his path of approach and focus on the identified threat(s) in front of him.

Being mindful of the background at all times—if that is possible in this situation—the officer should fire upon the gunman as quickly and early as possible.  Many of the AS suspects almost immediately commit suicide upon the realization of police presence.  If all it does is succeed in getting the suspect to engage the officer, it has at least diverted him from the murder of innocents.  A 150 yard shot with a pistol is not out of the question--and should be taken--given the goal of diverting his attention stopping the killing.

If the suspect is inside a room (as in a school) or inside a shop (in a mall), attempt to engage the suspect from the outside in.  Don’t make entry unless it is absolutely needed.  A dynamic pie slice or slide across the entrance while engaging the shooter is safer than making entry.  If the shooter has apparently posted in a hard corner, a limited entry (eyes and weapon only) is often the best option.  Hit him, and withdraw.  If entry is a necessity due to circumstance, enter along the path least likely to be obstructed and fire on the move.  Do not stop.  Entering, posting up, and shooting from a static position is the last option, and the least safe.

If he retreats because of your presence, be aggressively cautious in following him.  Sprint from cover to cover, keeping as concealed as possible.  Be constantly ready for any attack.  Shoot at him (and hit him) as soon as possible, and continue shooting until he is down to prevent his gaining access to more victims and/or potential hostages.

Once the suspect is down, be prepared to defend yourself against a possible second suspect.  Never handcuff the suspect alone.  That is a two-officer task at minimum.

Conclusion

It is time to give up the misguided notion of formation techniques in the response to an Active Shooter.  Not only are they misapplied, but they are dangerous to the officers attempting to respond to this dangerous situation.  They are less than useful because they are slow, giving the shooter much more access to victims.  Additionally, consider this:

• How frequently are officers trained in these formations?  Once a year in forward thinking agencies, but generally once or twice in a lifetime for most officers.  With dearth of frequent training, how well will officers perform this complicated technique under real-time pressures, hearing gunfire, and moving toward the shooter?
• What is the quality of that training?  Training cannot duplicate real-life.  However, training can sometimes approximate it, and the closer to real-life this training is, the more likely it will be that the formation fails and falls apart.

Instead, the response should be contextually-correct:  time is of the essence in saving lives;  a solo-officer response early is better than a multi-officer response too late to save lives.  The officer should be armed with a shoulder weapon and breaching equipment.  Running to the sound of gunfire, and being cautiously aggressive when close, the suspect should be fired upon without warning upon first being observed.  This should disrupt the shooter’s murder spree and get him to focus on the officer.  Hopefully the suspect will be like most who engage in this type of mass murder, and will immediately turn the weapon on himself.  If not, he just might engage the officer, giving the civilians a possible break.  Backup officers will then assist in stopping the suspect, and take him into custody (in whatever manner that manifests).  Following officers can then respond, set up a Casualty Collection Point, assist in a thorough search for additional suspects and victims, and secure the scene.

It is time for tactics to change to fit the real-world realities of the Active Shooter incident, and increase the likelihood of interdicting these murders of innocents.  A solo officer, or, if there is near simultaneous response, two-officer teams moving aggressively and tactically to the sound of gunfire and immediately shooting the gunman/gunmen is, to date, the only real response that can be expected to save lives.  Time to update training programs, drop the archaic and impractical formation concept, and deal with the real world as it is, not how we’d like it to be.

Equipment Note:  Every officer should be equipped with breaching equipment as standard gear carried in every patrol (burdening the sergeant's car with even more equipment than is required now doesn't make sense as the supervisor may not arrive for the first ten minutes of a call--cops who need the equipment should have it available to them).  The equipment should consist of:

1. Bolt cutters.  This should be standard equipment presently in every officer's car.  If your agency won't purchase it, shell out the $35.00 for one of your own...you're the one who will be listening to people dying and not able to enter, not your Chief.
2. Benchmade Model 172 Tomahawk.  Designed for military breaching requirements (not as an antipersonnel weapon), it is perfectly suited to breaching obstacles preventing access and ingress.  Easily portable, it is part hooligan tool and part breaching axe.  Its small size belies big capabilities.  For a 40% discount on all Benchmade products, contact us at training@cuttingedgetraining.org and request a "Benchmade Discount Form" (law enforcement, military, Fire, and EMS only).
3. ESS professional eyewear is available for a 40% discount through Cutting Edge Training.  Contact us at training@cuttingedgetraining.org and request an "ESS DepRep Discount Code."

Be safe.  Shoot straight.

Police officers have been armed with firearms almost since the inception of law enforcement in the US.  Since equipping officers with handguns, shotguns, submachineguns, and rifles, officers have pointed those weapons at suspects whom those officers believed to be a reasonable threat.  Many shootings have been prevented as a result.

Is that practice wrong? 

In the last few years, some well-known gun writers and police trainers have been urging officers, agencies, and law enforcement in general to consider the pointing of a firearm at a suspect that the officer does not intend to immediately shoot as a “violation” of safety rules.  The basis of their beliefs?  Number 2 of the Range Safety Rules as codified by Jeff Cooper and taught at Gunsite Ranch:  “Never let the muzzle cover anything you are not willing to destroy.”

One trainer wrote that “while not a violation of law,” pointing a gun at a suspect and not shooting is a violation of the safety rules of gunhandling.  This, he reasoned, should subject the officer to discipline by his agency, and “could” cause the officer and agency to be civilly liable.

It is vitally important to understand why these well-intentioned individuals are mistaken in their beliefs, and how to argue against the inevitable accusations by plaintiffs and the media (as well as those in your own agency) who claim that any pointing of a firearm at a suspect without firing it is a violation and should be subject to sanction and/or civil judgment. 

Bottom line:  When an officer has a reasonable belief that a suspect or situation might be dangerous or threatening, he or she may point a firearm at a suspect in order to ensure their safety.  It is lawful to do so.  And it is NOT in any way a safety violation of “range” safety rules in many situations to point a gun at a suspect who may be armed, violent, or outnumber officers.

As trainers, there are consequences to everything we do and say—often resulting in life-or-death.  If this misunderstanding of range rules in the street is permitted to grow and become “normalized” as part of training doctrine, the courts will sooner rather than later incorporate it into their understanding of “proper” police work.  From that moment on, any officer who points his or her weapon at a suspect and fails to fire will be guilty of excessive force.  The result?  More officers hesitating to draw guns, more police shootings with suspects who thought they could beat the cop to the draw or that the officer was not serious about the threat to shoot because the gun isn't pointing at him/her.  And more officers shot down.

Be careful what you wish for—you may get it.

POINTING A GUN CAN BE EXCESSIVE FORCE

Officers can be subject to discipline and liability when they point their weapons at individuals or groups when the officer is then unable to articulate the threat he or she believed existed at the time.  The latest case where a federal court stated that pointing a firearm (in this case, a handgun) at a subject is “excessive force” when there is no legal reason to do so is Baird v. Renbarger (7th Cir., 576 F.3d 346, January, 2010).  From the facts of the case it would be apparent to any reasonable officer that pointing a gun in this situation might be unreasonable:

• An officer who was verifying a VIN during a visit to an auto shop reasonably believed the VIN had been tampered with.
• Returning the next day with a search warrant, the officer pointed a 9mm subgun at the occupants of the business, forcing them at gunpoint to sit on the floor together.
• The officer then detained the occupants of other businesses at gunpoint, including a group of Amish men, requiring them to sit with the others who were detained.

The federal district court determined that it was not “objectively unreasonable” in these circumstances to aim a submachinegun at wholly compliant and non-threatening subjects.  The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals used the factors within the totality of the facts known to the officer at the time of Graham v. Connor in its analysis:

• The severity of the crime at issue:  The crime of altering a VIN is one that is not associated with violence.  The court remarked, “…this is a far cry from crimes that contain the use of force as an element, crimes involving the possession of illegal weapons, or drug crimes, all of which are associated with violence.”
• The threat of the subject to officers or others:  This officer had been to the auto shop the day before, but articulated no belief that the occupants were threatening in any way.  On the day of the warrant service, all of them immediately complied with his and other officers’ orders.
• The active resistance or attempt at flight:  None of the detained subjects resisted or attempted to escape.

Other courts have ruled that an officer pointing a gun at a suspect absent indications of threat is excessive force, including the 9th Circuit in Robinson v. County of Solano (2002) and 3rd Circuit in Baker v. Monroe Township (2005).  Some of the facts in these and other cases leading to a finding of excessive force are:

• Even though they were investigating a crime of illegally shooting dogs, it was excessive force to point a gun at a handcuffed, searched prisoner for an extended period of time.
• Detaining a child/children at gunpoint. 
• Pointing a gun at the head of an elderly man after he had been handcuffed.

Generally it is not justified to point any firearm at a compliant individual when the circumstances are not threatening.  Even if the circumstances were threatening a few moments ago, as soon as that changes, officers must reflect those changes in their behavior and stop pointing guns at people. 

Another bottom line:  Point a firearm at a person only when you can articulate the danger this person poses to you, whether it is through their acts or their connection to the dangerous circumstances you are investigating.  Failing to explain why you needed to point your weapon at someone can create huge problems for you. 

THE COURTS SUPPORT OFFICERS POINTING GUNS AT PEOPLE WHEN JUSTIFIED

The US Supreme Court has always held that it is permissible for the police to point guns at people suspected of violent or weapon-related crimes.  This includes those who are suspected of a non-violent crime but who are known to have carried weapons in the past.  Federal Circuit Courts routinely have ruled that officers may hold people at gunpoint when the circumstances reasonably create the fear of violence.  Even the 9th Circuit in 2002, in the case, Duran v. City of Maywood stated that two officers moving toward the location of a shots-fired call with their handguns drawn did not increase the likelihood of a shooting. 

When an officer believes the circumstances could be possibly threatening or violent, especially those involving drugs, weapons, or violent individuals, the drawing and pointing of a weapon is not prohibited. 

VIOLATING “RANGE RULES”?

There can be little question that a firearm is a dangerous tool.  It is designed and intended to harm a living being in defense of life (or hunting for meat).  Its carry and display must be regulated and training imposed upon officers in order to reasonably minimize the chance for needless tragedy by preventing unintentional discharge.

Range rules were developed through hard won wisdom.  A moment’s inattention or distraction and someone is injured or killed.  As these range rules have been promulgated and enforced, injuries from firearms accidents have steadily decreased.  Firing ranges are generally safe places to be as a result.

The National Rifle Association’s “Gun Safety Rules” include only three components:  1. Always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction;  2. Always keep your finger off the trigger until ready to shoot;  3.  Always keep the gun unloaded until ready to use.  This is a good start for gun safety, especially while hunting non-dangerous game, or while shooting recreationally on a cold range where weapons remain unloaded until directed otherwise by a range safety officer.  However, a hot range is more suitable for law enforcement training purposes.

Jeff Cooper of the American Pistol Institute at Gunsite Ranch in Arizona developed a version of these rules, one that most officers have been trained in.  The four “inviolate” Firearms Safety Rules are:  1.  All guns are always loaded;  2.  Never let the muzzle cover anything you are not willing to destroy;  3.  Keep your finger off the trigger until your sights are on the target;  4.  Always be sure of your target.  This article is not intended to discuss the efficacy of these range rules as they are stated (which should certainly be up for discussion).  Rather, their application and intention, especially where Safety Rule Number Two is concerned will be discussed.

THE “RULE 2 STANDARD?”

The trainers and writers who are promulgating the “Rule 2 Standard” (essentially, “Never point a firearm at a suspect unless you intend to immediately shoot”) explain that while it is legal to point a firearm at a person in limited cases, it is a “violation” of the safety rules.  It is therefore unsafe and should be prohibited.  They say that while having your handgun (or shoulder weapon) in your hands early in dangerous circumstances is a good thing (because, as we all know, the fastest drawn gun is the one that is already in your hand), actually pointing it without the immediate intention to shoot is not.  The in-hand weapon should be held in a low-ready or off the line of the suspect until the decision to shoot is made.  Additionally they note that there is little difference in reaction-response times between a properly positioned weapon that is held off-target and one that is held on-target.  This, they reason, will reduce or eliminate the possibility of injury due to unintentional discharge and resulting civil liability.

While some or all of their reasoning for why they believe an officer should not point guns at people they do not intend to shoot may be true, the purpose of an officer possessing a firearm is not about civil liability prevention.  It is, rather, about defense of life and creating compliance.  The “Rule 2 Standard” is a misapplication of something that is true in one context but is wholly incorrect in another.  Officers carry handguns, and are permitted to employ shoulder weapons for the following reasons:

Defense of life.  The main purpose for carrying a firearm is to shoot another person to save life.  Stopping a suspect’s imminent or actual threat to life by shooting bullets through their body is the only proven method of quickly stopping life-threatening behavior.

Shooting a person necessarily requires the muzzle to be pointed at him.  Proponents of the “Don’t Violate the Rule” are not against officers shooting people who earn getting shot.  Their concerns are how and when that muzzle is brought on target.  Their focus is on unintentional discharges.  That is the center of this discussion, and a misunderstanding of the second purpose for pointing weapons at people who are just about to be shot if they don’t change their behavior NOW.  

Creating Compliance.  Many, if not most, have had the experience of a non-compliant suspect in a dangerous situation, or possibly armed, suddenly become compliant when confronted by the muzzle of a weapon held by a very determined and focused officer.  While many suspects know that an officer isn’t going to shoot them even when a gun is pointed at them, all but the mentally ill and those under-the-influence understand there is a fine line between a gun being pointed at you and that gun being fired at you. 

What creates compliance when muzzling a suspect?  The immediate fear of being shot.  The mere presence of a handgun in a police confrontation is universal—officers carry handguns at all times.  The presence of a handgun on the officer’s hip does not stop fights or gunfights.  Even when that gun is in an officer’s hand, it is still simply present in the situation—it is only a matter of degree of the threat that all officers carry with them. 

This changes when the officer points his handgun directly at the suspect.  Confrontations with armed suspects result in compliance because that suspect knows that if he tries to outdraw a handgun pointing at him, he will lose—and non-suicidal suspects know that “ties go to the cops.”  Simply put, many, many shootings are prevented because officers muzzle suspects. 

HOW DO WE TRAIN IT OUT OF COPS?

So let’s say we do adopt the “Rule 2 Standard,” and declare that pointing a gun without shooting is a violation of policy, tactics, safety, and law.  What will be the result?

Slower response to deadly threats.  Most will agree that officers today are much slower to respond with force than their forbearers.  This reflects our society today.  I submit that officers will be slower to draw and fire their weapons than they are even today.  Due to more sophisticated offenders who already take advantage of the system, the allegations (both true and false) of “the officer pointed his weapon at me” will increase.  This will especially be true in court, both criminal and civil.  The He said/She said nature of many of these complaints will cast a pall across law enforcement, causing many to leave their handguns in their holsters until the last possible moment before shooting for fear of being falsely accused of brandishing their weapons.

In certain circumstances, officers will point their guns anyway due to their own fear and desire to stop a shooting from occurring.  Many officers, if not most, have had the experience of facing a suspect whose actions were so intense and threatening that the officer could have legally shot them, but didn’t for some reason.  Universally, these incidents were emotionally startling in their intensity and focus.  I would submit that having a weapon in one’s hand and not threatening a dangerous person with it before shooting, if given time, would be a very difficult training issue and one that cannot be prevented.

Yes, many instances could be modified to be “Rule 2 Standard” compliant where officers believe there to be “reasonably threatening” circumstances in which officers now legally point guns at people.  Of course, there will be an attendant increase of shootings, and the resultant increase in suspect and officer injuries and death.

However, in those immediately threatening instances not yet meeting the imminent threat to life or safety threshold demanded for deadly force, where an officer is frightened by the suspect’s behavior, and desperately wanting to avoid being forced to shoot the suspect, I would submit that it is natural to point a gun at a perceived threat, and is something we cannot “train out of officers.”

Pointing a gun is the highest level of threat—short of actually shooting—an officer has.

Humans who feel threatened and are, in turn, threatening the other person, tend to naturally point the most dangerous weapon at their adversary before any blows are exchanged.  This intimidation is designed to avoid physical conflict.  When posturing, unarmed combatants will point with their fingers or shake their fist(s).  If armed with a knife, the knife will be displayed as a warning.  A club will be ominously swung in the direction of the threat.  Guns are pointed as a display of warning and threat. 

How is something this instinctive trained out of an officer?  It can’t be.  The result of “Rule 2 Standard” requirements will be that many officers will be disciplined and lose their jobs as a result of their natural and instinctive responses to great danger.  Citizen complaints will increase.  False accusations of brandishing by criminal defendants and civil plaintiffs will become the norm, forcing officers to argue in the negative (arguing about something they didn’t do).  The civil liability exposure for “excessive force” will dramatically increase, resulting in more lawsuits and increased litigation costs.

MUZZLING A SUSPECT IS NOT A “VIOLATION”

There is no “violation” of range safety rules when pointing a weapon at a suspect when the situation is sufficiently threatening.  Rule #2 states:  “Never let the muzzle cover anything you are not willing to destroy.”  It says, “…willing to destroy,” not going to destroy.  This is a paper target-only rule when taken literally. 

A police officer who muzzles a suspect is conveying his willingness to shoot that person.  However, that officer is communicating to that individual that he simply has not made the decision to shoot him yet, but is close:  that decision is now up to the suspect and his actions.

The law as interpreted by the courts permits officers to point guns at suspects in justified circumstances.  An officer who points a gun at a suspect is blatantly telling that suspect to change his behavior immediately or he’ll be shot.  As Clint Smith says, “The muzzle of a .45 pretty much means ‘go away’ in any language.” 

It is a misunderstanding of the gun safety rules intended to increase range safety and safer gun-handling.  Officers have a context of not only shooting to protect life, but to attempt to protect life by reasonably intimidating a threatening suspect by pointing a weapon at him in hopes of preventing a shooting.

By following the “Shall not point guns unless shooting” concept, it will likely be sooner rather than later that officers will be prohibited by the courts from this important safety practice.  Yes, unintentional discharges occur, but not at a greater frequency than before.  And when they happen, agencies will settle with the plaintiff to compensate for the loss.  But the shooting of more suspects who will attempt to fight their way out of an arrest when confronted by an officer hamstrung in his ability will be out of proportion to the limited number of injuries from unintentional discharges.  Often, this is the only chance an officer has to prevent a shooting is to point a gun at the subject and convince that suspect that the only way out alive is to comply.

Adopting this misinterpretation of “Rule 2” will increase civil liability beyond anything now seen from the few unintentional discharges that occur in US law enforcement.  Many more suspects will be shot and injured and killed.  More to the point will be the needless loss of police officers in the line of duty because of a misinterpretation of something that was originally designed to keep them and all gun owners safer. 

Let’s really think about the very real consequences of this before incorporating it into our legal and tactical doctrine.

The situation is familiar to patrol officers:  a parolee “hanging” on the street, sitting on one heel, leaning back against a wall, forearms resting on his knees, talking to his associates.  Every officer has seen this.  Is this simply a “comfy” way to relax while talking to friends rather than standing or sitting on the concrete?  Or could there be something more.

While there are individuals in whose cultures this is a common way to relax, the possibility that this is a parolee or gangster requires officers to be cautious and appreciate the threat this position can pose to safety.  Officers must take precautions during any subject contact with an individual who is in or assumes this position.  Even though “it feels” like the officer standing has the advantage, the person in the “prison crouch” or squat (the term, “prison squat” seems to be perceived by jurors as more vulgar in court, although that is more accurate) has many tactical advantages.

All State Corrections Officers can tell you that parolees assume this position for two reasons:

1. Prisons are made of concrete.  Concrete is cold.  Sitting on cold concrete for years, according to convicts, will give the person hemorrhoids. 
2. Sitting flat on your butt in prison prevents effective response to sudden attack.  Sitting on your butt on the floor or ground is an invitation to attack.

This “prison crouch”—sitting on one heel with the other foot flat and forward—is an indicator of a subject who may be a threat to an officer.  Even when the individual has not been to prison, this behavior is often seen in youngsters emulating the “OGs” who have. 

Sitting or squatting in this position is not the sole indicator of any individual having spent time in prison.  This position is seen, too, in Latin American immigrants, especially farm workers or those of the peasant class in their home countries.  These cultures continue to work the fields as they have for centuries.  When in the fields, there is no place to sit but on the dirt.  Instead, these immigrants (legal and illegal) will squat or crouch down like this as an alternative to standing.  However, when combined with other threat-cues, the prison crouch is a position an officer should approach with caution, being aware of the position’s capabilities.

 APPEARANCES AND CAPABILITIES

While to the lay-person the Prison Crouch seems to be a “submissive” position, it actually has inherent offensive and defensive capabilities that must be addressed in the field if an officer is to safely handle the situation.  The lay person often believes that since the individual is lower than the officer and sitting back, that the subject is therefore at a disadvantage. 

Not true: 

Lower than the officer.  With the officer standing over him while the subject is sitting on his heel, it appears the officer has an advantage of being “bigger” and “higher.”  However, the closer the officer gets to the subject, the more vulnerable his legs are to the suspect suddenly springing at the officer for a leg takedown.  Any wrestler or jujitsu-player will see this relative positioning as an opportunity to “shoot” for the leg(s) and take the officer down.  Even with extensive wrestling/jujitsu training, once someone is in the officer’s legs, it is very difficult to prevent that party from taking the officer down.  The subject’s being lower does not prevent his springing at the officer, and is therefore a danger signal that may result in serious assault.

Sitting back.  The lay person sees an individual “sitting” with his back against a wall.  This, they wrongly reason, will make it more difficult to move suddenly and attack anyone by surprise—especially an officer who is paying attention.  While opposing attorney’s may characterize the standard Prison Crouch as “a guy sitting ‘back’ on his heels,” the reality is that this position is defensive as well as offensive, and used by individuals in a predatory environment (prison) to prevent their being attacked without defense by other predators (fellow prisoners).  Kicks are easily deflected, punches to the head are extremely difficult, and tackling the individual results in an opponent who has all of his physical weapons (hands, feet, and head) available for groundfighting.  He’s low to the ground, and less likely to be injured when tackled, negating much of the value the tackle provides against a standing opponent.  And as officers who have experienced combative or resistive suspects in position know, individuals can stand up surprisingly fast when they want to. 

Submissive.  The lay person will see this prison crouch as a submissive position, and will often judge the situation to be one of dominance by the officer who is standing over the subject.  Actually, this is a position where one can lure the unwary individual easily into range for an almost indefensible takedown (without extensive and current training) on to a hard surface (concrete or asphalt) where elbows, wrists, and heads are vulnerable to possibly severe injury from striking the ground. 

There is a temptation to use the standing position and a louder, harsher voice from a closer position to attempt to convince the subject to comply.  Remember:  this position is designed as a defensive position.  An officer wandering into the subject’s range because of a natural perception that standing is advantageous and dominant can be a mistake that can cost an officer his health and possibly his life.

THREAT VERSUS CULTURE?

Is there a foolproof way to predict whether any individual is simply sitting versus a threat from a “prison crouch?”  No.  Are there indicators that should alert the officer to the threat of an individual who takes this position either as a defensive posture or as an attempt to lure the officer into range?  Of course. 

Failure to comply with orders to get on the ground or on his knees.  All non-compliance is, of course, a key threat indicator.  Taking a position contrary to that ordered, or remaining in a position after being told to move calls for caution and distance solutions (Taser or OC spray) rather than hands-on efforts or getting closer to exert one’s will.  By giving orders in Spanish (“Boca abajo,” literally, “mouth down,” but translated as “Get face down,” or “A tierra se,” or “Get on the ground”), future Criminal Defense and Plaintiffs attempts to portray the subject as unable to understand the officer’s intentions will be short circuited.

Changing orientation.  An individual who changes his orientation to the officer’s latest position is clearly maneuvering to engage the officer.  As the officer moves laterally, he rotates to remain oriented to the officer’s position, thereby protecting his flank.

Eyes remain on the officer.  The subject maintains eye-contact with the officer, tracking his or her movement.  Cultural indicators are submissive, and not looking authorities in the eye.  In their country of origin, the police are not someone whom a citizen safely confronts—even with sustained direct eye contact.  Anyone visually tracking the officer from the crouch or squat position and remaining alert to the officer’s position or actions should be treated as a threat to officer safety. 

Indicia of gang association.   Knowledge of gang involvement, gang-style clothing, and identifying tattoos transform this seated position into a “prison-crouch,” with all of the safety ramifications that entails.

Identifying and remaining aware of the threat-cues that a “prison crouch” or squat signifies will permit a safer contact.  This position alone may not justify a higher profile response.  However, its inherent strengths combined with one or more threat indicators call for a moderate distance response.  The first non-compliance indicator, failure to respond to legal commands, routinely justifies a distance response (the threat or use, as justified, of OC spray or Taser).  As the threat-cues compound and multiply, a higher profile response to someone in the prison crouch is needed. 

Be safe.  Wear your vest.  Know your policies, especially your force response, deadly force response, and pursuit policies by heart.  And thank you for taking care of me and mine, and us all.