Cutting Edge Training

Many intelligent and well-informed individuals have been warning for years that the world-wide trend of Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, or "PBIEDs" (whatever you call them, whether suicide bombers, homicide bombers, or “insane-dude-or-dudette-with-explosives-strapped-to-his/her-body-to-kill-others-and-self”) will come to our shores and be directed against our people.  It really is a matter of time.

So the question in some circles is raging:  Head shots vs. pelvis shots?  While head shots are seen as a sure means of stopping a subject and putting him down, how difficult is it to hit him in the head while he is moving, and you are feeling the life-threatening pressure knowing that if the vest detonates you and others will die?  And there is the added pressure that if you miss the shot completely, he/she will likely detonate, taking you and everyone else with him/her.  Pelvis shots with rifles and shotgun slugs are generally a body dropper because of the bone breaking capability of those rounds, but that does not stop the terrorist from self-detonating.  And pistol shots to the pelvis often cause the individual to bleed out, but rarely force a subject down due to mechanical disruption.

Another reality:  neither a successful head-shot, pelvis shot, or additional confirming shots to the head will stop a second individual from detonating that PBIED from a distance by a remote firing trigger.

Given that the first indication of the presence of a PBIED is generally an explosion with casualties, there have been instances where these individuals were discovered prior to their detonating their device.  These discoveries have generally been through good fortune, sloppiness on the part of the suicide-bomber, or a change of heart where a second individual remotely detonates the PBIED.  Some have actually been interdicted prior to detonation by alert security forces and, at least in one instance, an alert armed citizen.

If there is a possibility of shooting to interdict the detonation of a PBIED, is there a real-world danger of shooting this terrorist in the body?  What is the real-world implications of shooting to the torso and possibly hitting the vest components?  Before we begin developing doctrine, it is very important to determine our limitations and the context we must apply them in.  Supposition and dangerous assumptions has a long history of killing officers, warfighters, and others who are responding to threatening circumstances.

I had the privilege to speak at length to an...um...individual who is assigned to a US. Govt. facility where they test out cool and interesting things about this and other…um…topics.  They asked that very same question (shooting and hitting the PBIED).  They set about creating explosive vests using the most common components and designs from around the world.  Those devices were subjected to extensive “testing” to see what would happen.

The results of their shooting the heck out of those bombs?  Only one round in all of the testing set off a vest.  It was later determined that the bullet happened to hit the blasting cap, resulting in a partial detonation of the vest.  A few blocks of explosive did not detonate due to a sympathetic explosion.  Bottom line:  Even though there is a possibility of a partial detonation, the entire vest did not explode, and casualties would have been limited as a result.

His recommendation:  shoot the terrorist in the area you are most likely hit, and put him on the ground.  If the vest detonates due to a remote activation, a ground detonation will decrease the number and severity of collateral injuries—almost half of the shrapnel goes into the ground, and a good deal is directed vertically.

As a result this information, Cutting Edge Training's suggested doctrine is:

• If you are close enough, make a proximity-shot to the head, followed by a second round to the head.  Justification for the second round to the head:  the imminent danger of the bomber and his/her intent to commit mass, indiscriminant murder;  The presence of an explosive designed and intended to murder and maim others;  the triggering device is likely easily reached and activated, and the need for self-defense—you are in proximity—and defense of others justifies this action to stop any possible detonation by the suspect.  Immediately evacuate the area, including yourself to prevent injuries should the PBIED be remotely detonated.
• If you are close enough, or have the equipment (red-dot and/or magnification), and the situation is static—you are braced enough and the bomber is still enough, take a head shot, followed by a second shot to the head (the same justification as above).  Immediately evacuate the area (including self).
• Take the shot at any target that you can hit, including any part of the torso.  Do not permit the bomber to deploy or transition to a position where he/she is able to maximize the casualties.  It will NEVER be better than NOW--shoot the torso.  Understand that bullets rarely work at stopping anyone from anything unless the brain, spine, or major load-bearing bone is disrupted.  Bullets stop people because they believe they need to fall down because they are hit, or they don't want to be shot anymore, or they leak enough blood to stop them from being able to stand.  So shoot that person a lot, then shoot him/her in the head at least twice.  Same justification, same immediate evacuation plan.

Let's keep everything in context:

• If a shot is taken, the bullet hits the detonator, and the vest explodes, it is no different than if the terrorist executed his mission, except the officer disrupted his timing and likely minimized casualties.
• If the shot at the head is taken and missed, the terrorist may decide to detonate then and there, or run to an area where maximum casualties will occur.  Now a shot to the torso (including the pelvis) is the only option left, and a running, dodging target presents all sorts of background problems, as well as increasing the difficulty of making the shot.
• If the shot to the head or torso (including the pelvis) is only partially successful, a detonation will probably be the result.
• A successful head shot and instant death of the bomber may still result in a remote det of the system.
• A shot to the torso that actually hits the detonator is unlikely, though possible, to create a detonation.  But that shot is more likely to hit the threat than a small target such as the head of a moving, breathing animated human.
• Due to the imminent threat of this individual, regardless of his medical status, a second (or many) shot(s) to the head to ensure his inability to detonate the vest is justified.

Head shot, pelvis shot, or torso shot?  Here’s a thought about will like be the foremost reality:  Identifying the individual carrying a PBIED with the certainty that most cops are going to need before taking a shot at anyone will likely be the main obstacle at anyone taking a shot before the PBIED is detonated.  No cop wants to shoot an innocent person.  How will there be enough certainty (probable cause) to press a trigger unless the PBIED is visible.  If the individual reveals the bomb-vest, it’s likely just to gain enough attention of his/her victims in the moments before detonation that a first responder will likely not be able to respond.

If able to respond in time?  Shoot him/her to the ground.  Quickly shoot him/her in the head enough times to visually confirm that the first stage of imminent threat is over.  And then get out everyone out—including you—as quickly as possible to avoid the effects of a remote detonation—leave the body and evidence for someone else.  Besides, that’s what the EOD tech’s signed up for (what were they thinking?).

Be safe.  Decide fast.  Shoot straight.

During a “routine” response to a call for service, Officer Johnson detains a subject for further investigation.  As the questioning progresses, the individual becomes more and more evasive and contradictory.  Eventually, the officer establishes that he has probable cause to arrest the suspect.  During the arrest process, the suspect resists by first struggling, and then thrashing about and trying to hit the officer with his arms in a bid to get away.  With no backup officer present and the situation getting more and more out of control, Officer Johnson feels he needs to get the man down on the ground to gain some control over the situation.  He tries a "takedown technique" several times, but the suspect defeats every effort.  The situation is getting a bit desperate.  Johnson wraps his arms around the suspect, driving him to the ground.  The subject lands on his elbow, shattering it, suffering what will be a lifelong injury.  Officer Johnson immediately radios for an EMS response and a supervisor to respond.  In his narrative arrest report, Officer Johnson does a good job of articulating the factors in his force decision-making, as well as his actions post-force to get the suspect treatment.

Officer Johnson’s takedown, while objectively reasonable under the circumstances, is not considered by his agency to be an “approved” technique.  He is deemed to have been "out of policy," and therefore his force was "excessive."  He is disciplined.  Officer Johnson appeals the suspension, but loses because his agency points out in arbitration that the agency force policy requires only approved techniques be employed in the arrest of a resisting suspect.  Agency civil attorneys, as a result of the disciplinary findings, eventually negotiate a six-figure settlement to the plaintiff's tort claim.  Officer Johnson and his fellow officers become even more hesitant and uncertain about responding with force as a result of the administration's actions--morale problems deepen. 

This scenario, played out in too many jurisdictions, begs a huge question:  How can it be that an officer can “reasonably” respond with force but still be “out of policy” by employing a technique that is “not approved," thereby creating the situation where the force was "negligent"?  Many agencies have bought into a concept of “correct” or “approved” techniques—generally to their officers’ and the agency’s detriment.  Some agencies break this down further into varying categories, “approved,” “approved but not completed,” and “not-approved but reasonable.”  And, of course, “not approved.”  This drive to create a system of utilizing only approved techniques does not comport with federal or even state laws regarding officer force response.  In fact, it creates an artificial liability, both to the agency and the officer.  This is a concept that should reviewed, critiqued, and finally abandoned by law enforcement.

FORCE RESPONSE AND THE POLICE

That officers respond with force to suspect resistance and assault is an activity that is not questioned except by the most radical citizens in our country.  As a matter of law, the police force response is governed by the 4th Amendment of the US Constitution as interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris (2007) and Graham v. Connor (1989).  In fact, the matter of what constitutes “excessive force” is well settled and is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “force which is not justified under the circumstance known to the officer at the time.”  Again, the matter of judging how the officer responded with force, the duration and level of the force, as well as the injuries inflicted versus the reasonably perceived threat is clearly spelled out.  Force is, in a phrase, “outcome-based.”

Nowhere in Scott (or in Graham) is there mention of “proper” or “approved” technique.  Nowhere is there a discussion of what the officer might have done differently that might have been less intrusive.  Instead, the inherent wisdom of Scott tells law enforcement that if the officer’s force response was objectively reasonable when the balancing test of "the likelihood of injury to the suspect is balanced with the reasonable perception of threat to the officer or others" is met, based upon the totality of the circumstances known at the time.  Graham asks us to look at the totality of the facts as well, including (but not limited to) the severity of the crime at issue, the immediate threat of the suspect, and the active resistance to arrest or attempt to escape.  If the officer's actions in response to a reasonably perceived threat is reasonable (NOT perfect, but reasonable), then the force response cannot be excessive.  The Court, in these and subsequent cases, fundamentally defines how an officer’s force response should be evaluated. 

REASONABLE FORCE IS NOT ABOUT “TECHNIQUES”

As already noted, there are no requirements in any case law to use techniques “correctly.”  To require officers to utilize any technique denies a fundamental truth about real world force.  In the real world, a police force response is not a logical series of moves that automatically results in overcoming resistance.  Instead, a fight is defined by Cutting Edge Training as “a series of mistakes corrected as you make them.”©  Every fight is series of rapidly presented and ever changing problems to be solved.  Every physical struggle is dynamic and unpredictable.

Techniques, however, require time to develop and unfold.  Each "move" within a technique is a vital "linchpin"--if any move fails or is missing, the entire "technique" fails.  This means that as the officer is in the process of applying the series of moves comprising the technique against a real-world resisting suspect, the situation can completely change, rendering the need for that specific technique moot.  Generally, techniques require the cooperation of the suspect to be successful because of this—officers just cannot react quickly enough to the situational changes to make the technique work.  If, in the middle of the “second move” in any technique the subject moves his body, the technique fails.  The officer either improvises—and risks being out of policy—or regroups and tries to figure out another technique to apply as the suspect is in the midst of violently taking advantage of the first technique’s failure.  The idea that officers should use only “proper technique” puts officers’ safety in serious jeopardy.  It just isn’t practical in the real world.  Techniques nearly always fail given the slightest resistance by the suspect. 

Techniques are also complicated and difficult to remember--especially so in the heat of combat.  This is because each is designed to be applied to one specific attack or situation.  The unique situation calling for a "rear wrist lock" is not the same as an "outside twist lock," which is not the same as that calling for a "front goose neck" which is not the same as a any other situation calling for a specific, unique response.  The reality is that we can teach officers 3, 30, or even 300 techniques specific attacks.  How does one remember even 30 techniques that must be perfectly performed when a suspect is attempting to injure the officer?

Additionally, most of these "techniques" were not designed to "control" another human being--they were originally designed to injure, break, and kill a soldier on a battlefield, and were only adapted to civilian use (and, decades later, to police training) as a method of training in the martial arts without injury.   This creates contextual problems for any application of technique.  Taking anything out of context generally renders that object or concept null and void.  For instance, attempting to take a technique that is designed to permanently disable a limb by breaking bones or dislocating joints, and then modifying it as a "pain compliance" method fails for several reasons. 

• Ancient military application would call for the enemy warrior to first be injured in some manner, through a strike by a weapon or punch or kick.  This gives the warrior time to complete the series of moves needed for the "technique" and disable the limb.  The warrior would quickly follow up with a killing blow to dispatch the enemy before moving on to engage others enemy soldiers.
• Diluting a method of breaking or killing into something that it was never designed to accomplish has huge unintended consequences.  Officers are trained to employ techniques on suspects who are uninjured and physically fresh.  The suspect is free of psychological or physical impediments, enabling him/her to resist the series of movements required for a successful technique.
• The now-hybrid technique intended to "control" an individual permits the suspect the ability to unexpectedly escape--often easily--is completely ineffective for its intended purposes, unless the suspect is too injured or too fatigued to continue resisting. 

Further, this adaptation of a technique from "breaking" an arm to "controlling" an arm through pain requires the suspect's cooperation.  The suspect must honor the pain without going beyond the limits of the body's structure, or the arm breaks.  Whenever this occurs, the officer is predictably accused of employing excessive force. 

This concept of teaching "techniques" that are now "approved" fails any test of reality:

• The defense and control situations that officers face are literally infinite, and the limited number of techniques of any system cannot address all of the variations officer face.
• How is any officer with an average of 80 hours of training can instantly recognize any situation and then instantly select the correct response and then instantly respond?  They cannot.  It takes time to respond, and then time to apply the technique, causing most techniques to fail.
• Techniques are designed to teach "principles"--not to be employed "as-is" on a resisting suspect.
• Techniques routinely--almost universally--fail when the subject upon which they are being used resists in any manner.

Reasonable force is, instead, about recognizing that human beings in uniform realistically respond to the chaos of real-world assaults and resistance with levels and durations of force that are justified by the situation.  For example, given a suspect who is threatening to “fight” with an officer who has just arrested him, one officer might attempt a limb restraint.  Another might try a takedown, while others might spray him with OC or use a TASER to subdue him.  All are reasonable, although some are less tactically sound than others.  The only caveat for evaluating force is reasonableness based on the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time. 

Real force against a living human being who is motivated to resist being taken into custody and who may elect to injure or kill the arresting officer(s) is definitely not a static event.  Its inherent dynamism requires constant improvisation on the part of the arresting officer who has scant fractions of seconds to react to protect himself and/or impede the suspect's efforts.  Techniques, approved or not, fail any test in the real world where they are supposed to be applied. It is a false standard that cannot stand any type of "reality test."

CONCLUSION

There is a large segment of law enforcement, encouraged by vendors supplying training (who have a financial interest in remaining the "approved training source"), that has bought into the concept of evaluating force based on “proper” or “approved” technique.  This is a concept--especially in agency policy and court testimony--that should be abandoned because:

• Requiring an officer to respond only with an “approved” technique is not realistic.  The human condition and the limits of police training cannot respond to infinite number of attacks and resistance they face with specific counters and counters-to-counters and counters-to-counters-to-counters, ad infinitum. 
• Officers are routinely forced to improvise in their force response efforts.  This need for improvisation routinely surfaces in almost every defensive tactics situation where a suspect resists.  This means that officers cannot realistically use “approved techniques in even a majority of arrests.
• Civil liability is increased in situations where officers achieve reasonable conduct but violate artificial policy restraints.

To be successful, techniques require a perfect application of force in a perfect situation under perfect circumstances.  If any factor fails in its perfection, the technique fails and the officer is forced to improvise.  Instead, officers and their force response should be judged by the objectively reasonable standard described in Scott and Graham.  This standard is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time, rather than on a technical standard based on the concept of an ideal application of force that regularly fail in the real world.  Through this standard, every interested party benefits.  Force in America by police is judged from its outcome.  The officer is more fairly judged in his or her work product, the agency does not manufacture liability where none exists, and the suspect, protected by the reasonableness requirements of the law, remains the "architect of his own fate" and responsible for requiring the officer to respond with force.

In January, 2009, the Force Science Research Center (FSRC), headed by Dr. William Lewinsky, came out with another excellent but preliminary study that certainly will increase officer safety.  This study alerted law enforcement to the dangers of an unrestrained prone suspect with his hands tucked under this torso.  However, as can happen with any study, misunderstandings regarding the study’s published conclusions seem to be popping up.  The FSRC will soon come out with the findings of their completed research project, conducted with the assistance of Sgt. Craig Allen and the excellent Force Tactics Instructor team of the Hillsboro, Oregon, Police Department.  These misunderstandings involve responding with force that will likely prove to be difficult or even impossible to justify. 

I first became aware of study, and saw a preliminary draft of the article by Dr. Lewinsky while teaching a DT instructor (Effective Combatives Problem-Solving Instructor:  TRAIN-THE-TRAINER) course for a large agency.  Various officers stated they felt the topic of problem-solving a subject’s hands out from under him following a takedown was now irrelevant in view of the new study’s findings.  They now believed the study justified shooting any suspect whose hands disappeared under his torso. 

I also received several e-mails from officers throughout the country asking my take on the study.  Each of these veteran officers were asking essentially the same question:  “Any time a suspect’s hands disappears under his torso, he may be armed and can move faster than I can respond.  Am I justified in shooting him because of well-known reaction-response disparities?”

Given the number of inquiries, there seems to be some level of confusion about the study’s conclusions and what officers may take away from its findings.  Bottom line, the FSRC’s study did not suggest that every prone suspect whose hands disappear is an imminent threat who needs to be shot.

FSRC TRANSMISSION #113

In an e-mail newsletter entitled, “FORCE SCIENCE NEWS: Transmission #113," the lead-in was:  “New FSRC study explores threat posed by prone suspects.”  The first paragraph states, “One of the most dangerous positions a suspect can assume on the ground is prone with his hands tucked under his body, either at chest or waist level.  What’s hidden in those hands?  And if it’s a gun, how fast can he twist and shoot if you’re approaching him?”

It continues, “The prone study…is expected to further pinpoint the formidable reactionary curve that officers are behind when attempting to prevent or respond to potentially lethal assaults.”  Importantly, the e-mail notes, “Role-playing a prone, armed offender with hands tucked under his body, he repeatedly turned to present and fire a gun as if shooting at a contact officer approaching him from the feet or side (emphasis added).”  “The average time it took him to make his threatening moves was ‘about one-third of a second…This speed would likely be faster than an average cover officer could react and shoot to stop the threat, even if the officer had his gun pointed, his finger on the trigger, and had already made his decision to shoot.’”

Simply put, approaching a prone subject (or anyone) who refuses to show his hands is very dangerous and may lead to the suspect spinning and shooting an officer.  This is the same principle as the “Folsom Roll” that I introduced to law enforcement a couple of decades ago, revealed by a paroled "associate" of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang who did not know I was a police trainer.  He moved so quickly from a standard “spread eagle prone” that I was unable to react (other than to grimace) before he hit me (very hard), pulled me over him, and simulated taking my holstered handgun.  He then simulated shooting the cover officer using me as a shield, and then me in the head.  This happened in a blink of an eye.

Dr. Lewinski’s study now documents what was practically and painfully demonstrated by this prepared offender.  Someone can move faster from a prone position than you can react.  If he has a gun, he will be able to shoot you faster than you can respond, even if you “think” you are ready.

CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING

Every force response depends upon “context.”  The police force response can only be reasonable when the officer is able to explain the context of his or her perception of the suspect’s behavior within the totality of the circumstances upon which the officer’s decision-making reasonably depended.  Broadly applying the FSRC prone suspect study to all prone suspects whose hands disappear is taking its findings out of context.

Situation:  if you are attempting to arrest a subject and he resists, the first (and best) option is to take him to the ground in the prone position.  Before and during the takedown, you will have noted that his hands were free from weapons.  On the ground, this suspect decides to continue to resist, delaying the inevitable by pulling his fists under his chest in the classic “Nuclear Turtle Position.”  

What is the context?  You are probably kneeling (or lying) on his back, using your body weight to hold him in place.  There is likely at least one other officer on top of him—or soon will be.  From this position, it will be very difficult for him to roll or fight his way to freedom.  His hands were clear of weapons during the fight, and he has simply locked them into his chest with no obvious pulling or grabbing motions. 

Solution?  Slow down.  Wait for at least one other officer to back you up.  Do not tase him (unless you can articulate a threat of violence).  Once there are at least two officers present and using their weight to hold him down, extend a baton, and shove the tip to the ground between his armpit and chest wall.  If he squeezes his arm against his torso, preventing the baton tip from being pushed to the ground, give him orders to “stop resisting” and stir the baton vigorously while pushing down.  Once the baton is deep enough, use it to pry the arm out from under the subject.  Upon seeing the wrist pried out by the baton, cuff it.  This gives you a handle, helping you force the cuffed wrist to the small of his back.  If he’s not paying attention and again fails to comply, repeat the same on the other side.  Then bring the arms together, and cuff the handcuffs to each other.  Once he is compliant, adjust the cuffs so that one pair of handcuffs are securing him.  If he won't calm or cooperate, he can be transported in two sets of cuffs--make sure you double-lock all four cuffs to avoid injury to the suspect.

Change of situation:  that same unsearched individual in a prone position with officer(s) on top of him begins digging in his waistband or chest/armpit area.

What is the context?  There is no plausible reason for a person in this situation to dig and grab at something in the waistband or armpit areas other than to arm himself.  This is quickly approaching an "imminent threat" situation. 

Time to quickly change gears.  With you on top of him, it will be problematic for the suspect to surprise you by sharply rolling.  Target the limb that is apparently being armed by quickly pressing your weight with your closest knee through his upper inner arm, pinning his shoulder and, more importantly, his elbow to the ground.  A second officer, if available, should similarly pin the other arm.  If additional personnel are present, immediately assign an armed cover (not "lethal cover") officer.  This officer should be far enough away from the pile to have a “big picture” view but still close enough to take a single step and deliver fight-ending “proximity shots” if reasonable.  If you are alone, draw your handgun. 

In either case, order him to, “Stop reaching!”  Tell him clearly and loudly that you will shoot him if he does not stop.  Make shoot/no-shoot decisions based on the totality of the facts known to you at the time.  Remember, you are not required to verify an actual weapon exists if you have a reasonable fear of imminent threat based on his behavior, provided you can articulate your reasonable belief sufficiently.

If you are a lone officer, and he then permits you to pull his lower arm and hand out from under him, use your non-dominant hand to pull while maintaining weight with your knee on the upper arm, preventing any independent action by the suspect.  As you take hold and maneuver his arm, be very aware of sympathetic grip response issues that might create an unintentional discharge, and maintain the muzzle in a direction that doesn’t endanger any human.  If the hand is empty, holster and cuff that wrist, taking him into custody.

THE UNRESTRAINED PRONE SUBJECT

Change of situation.  You have an unrestrained prone subject with his hands under his torso, and refusing to show his hands.  This may be where you (and hopefully multiple officers) are directing him into a known-risk/felony prone position and he chooses to bring his hands under him, or it may be following a shooting where his medical status or consciousness level is unknown.  Whatever the case, this subject is in a prone position and is not complying with orders to show his hands.

What is the context?  There is a reason this suspect is not showing his hands.  Just like any subject who refuses to show his hands, do not approach him.  He is not cooperating.  He must have a plan.  And part of his plan might include you walking up to him to force him to comply. 

Slow down and be patient.  This is a multiple officer problem.  An “L” shaped contact is safer (officers contact him from two separate positions approximately 90 degrees apart).  From positions of cover and ensuring clear fields of fire and background, the subject should be made aware that multiple armed officers are present.  Orders are given to show his hands.  Give him time.  It’s uncomfortable lying on concrete, asphalt, or even grass for an extended time.  Eventually he will adjust his position, possibly giving you visual access to his hands.

Failure to comply now creates a new tactical problem.  At some point, after numerous orders and sufficient effort to gain his compliance, someone will be required to go “hands-on.”

Ideally, a ballistic shield approach with four officers (one on the shield, one with a Taser©, and two contact officers) will be made, protected by at least one cover officer behind something that stops bullets.  Approach is from the side least likely to have a muzzle pointing at the team.  When the contact team is in position, the cover officer gives one more command to comply.

If there is no compliance, tase him from an optimal distance.  As soon as it appears he is under Taser© energy, the two contact officers immediately move forward to quickly pin both upper arms to the ground with their knees while he is under power.  The shield officer ditches the shield and uses his body weight through his knees on the suspect’s shoulders.  Any subsequent tasing should be employed only if he is about to get out of control again—not to gain his compliance with orders to move his hands.  Now that both arms and his torso are pinned, slow down, work the problem, and get him cuffed. 

If the “multiple officers with shield” option is not available, call for a K9.  If this isn’t an option, it remains a multiple officer problem.  Once backup is on-scene, the traditional selection of the contact officer through “the-least-time in-grade-goes-first” method still works, with the senior officer(s) protecting from behind cover.  Approach from the side least likely to have the muzzle pointing at you and get those shoulders and his upper arm pinned immediately. 

If he spins upon approach and you reasonably believe you are in imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, respond per your training.  The information that Dr. Lewinsky and his FSRC staff gained through their initial study will be extremely useful when articulating your decisions and defending your actions.

CONCLUSION

The Force Science Research Center has again made a serious and positive contribution to the safety of officers and a better understanding of the threats to life they face through the study of the capabilities of an unrestrained, prone suspect who has his hands tucked under him.  As I learned in the late ‘80s, a prone subject can move much faster than I can react.  Happily, all I suffered was a bruise and wounded pride.  If that had been real life and that parolee had been armed, I might not be here today.

The Force Science Research Center has again made a serious and positive contribution to the safety of officers and a better understanding of the threats to life they face through the study of the capabilities of an unrestrained, prone suspect who has his hands tucked under him.  As I learned in the late ‘80s, a prone subject can move much faster than I can react.  Happily, all I suffered was a fairly significant bruise and wounded pride.  If that had been real life and that parolee had been armed, I likely would not be here today.

Responding to the varying threats posed by proned suspects, just like every situation officers face, is a matter of context.  The latest FSRC study is very narrow in its scope, and should not be broadly applied to all situations involving a non-compliant suspect who tucks his arms under his body and refuses to be handcuffed.  It’s all a matter of context.

You're a conscientious cop who takes real pride in doing your job right.  Because this is the case, you might want to change how you talk about force after doing a good job on the street. 

All of your career, you have heard, been taught, and said the phrase, “use of force.”  You’ve read it in case law in the language of the courts.  Use of force is so synonymous with policing that no one thinks about the phrase—until you are the defendant in federal civil court wondering why in the world, after you did the job the way you were trained, are you being accused of misconduct?

Yes, you injured the suspect after responding to his behavior, but you responded to his resistance according to your training.  And you know your actions in overcoming his assault and attempts to flee were reasonable and well within the bounds of your agency policy.  Yet you are facing a trial in civil court as a defendant…what went wrong?

Actually, nothing really went “wrong.”  It’s the system.  The US Constitution requires the police, as government agents, to defend their actions against any person (citizen or not).  To meet this challenge, you must adequately address the "second half" of your enforcement activities.  This involves describing your actions accurately and in sufficient detail so that others who are not the police and who weren’t on-scene during the arrest can understand why you took the action you did.

The words you use matter.  A lot.  No kidding.

Let’s talk about the foundation of how you think about describing your job in a force incident.  Let’s consider two phrases:

1.    “The officer used force on the suspect.”

2.    “The officer responded with force to the suspect’s actions and behavior.” 

Is there a difference in the meaning between the two?  Is there one phrase that implies responsibility for the event and any outcome (injury to a suspect) to you as the arresting officer?

PHRASE ONE.  In the first phrase, the officer is the “actor using force.”  The officer is making the decision to hurt or shoot the suspect.  This phrasing reveals nothing about the suspect’s actions.  It plays into the media’s and Hollywood’s wildly inaccurate portrayal of the police (ever see a cop TV show or movie that looked anything like your real life job?).  This language puts the responsibility for the force employment solely on your shoulders.  The question is, where is the suspect and his/her behavior in this?

PHRASE TWO.  The second phrase is clearly demonstrating that the suspect is the “actor.”  If the suspect had not done “something,” there could be no need to “respond.”  The suspect is the cause of the event, not the officer.  While your response to his resistance resulted in his being injured, it was the suspect's behavior and actions creating the reasonable need for those injuries.

Even a casual understanding of constitutional and case law shows that officers may not simply “use force” on a suspect:

• In Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (2007), the balancing test in any force evaluation of the police is “the likelihood of injury or death to the suspect balanced with the apparent threat of the suspect to the officer or others” as reasonably perceived by the officer.  
• In Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989), officers are required to base their force decisions on “the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time.”  Just three factors cited by the court are “the severity of the crime at issue” (the crime you are responding to with force—generally resistance or assault—not necessarily the crime for which he’s being arrested), “the threat of the suspect,” and “the active resistance or attempts to flee.”  

The majority decisions in each of these cases extensively discusses the need for describing the suspect's behavior and threatening actions.  In each of these major, controlling US force cases, the focus is not on the officer, but on the suspect’s actions forcing the officer to respond. 

It’s time to change your language to protect yourself and your agency.  By describing the event as a “force response,” you use accurate phrasing to describe what you do.  It sets up the next step for your articulation and justification of your force response.  Consequently, your reporting of the force event will be more accurate in describing the offender's actions and behavior (both subtle and overt) that led you to reasonably perceive the suspect's resistance, threat, and/or attempts to flee.  This simple change--"responding with force"--benefits you, your partners and agency, your community, and the jury members who simply want to understand what happened during the incident.  By describing your specific response to each threatening or resistive action taken by the suspect, you are more likely to be rewarded with a fair judgment of your actions. 

If you follow this suggestion, your language will probably begin sounding like:

• “I responded to his (actions and behavior) by...”
• “I was involved in a force response incident created by the Defendant/Plaintiff's behavior, when I observed him...”
• “I responded to his resistance by (which ever reasonable response options you employed to overcome his resistance or attempts to flee).”

Be safe.  Wear your vest every day, every shift.  In your reports, tell us why you responded to the suspect’s behavior and actions.