Coming of age in the world of men of action, guns,
and danger, one is taught that the subject of “Tactics” (capital “T”) is
something you should know and be good at applying in order to stay “safe” and
be effective. To learn to be “tactical,”
you’re generally given a list of actions to take given a specific incident or
event—and there are a lot of events where tactics are necessarily employed. Those who are good at memorizing and then
recalling under the pressure of the real world tend to excel at tactics. But what about the others in the profession
at arms who do not?
But there are many who “don’t get it.” They got the same lists of do’s and don’t’s
that everyone else did. Like everybody
else, they were forced to memorize them.
And yet, the ability to apply these lists and act tactically didn’t
take. Everyone has these folks in their
agency, team, or unit. And for some
reason, they often don’t get hurt when they probably should have—until they do,
or they get someone else hurt or killed.
What is it about “tactics,” that some get it and
others do not? Many of those who “get it” actually tend to
grasp what is behind the laundry list of tactics, seeing the principles that
are the basis of the tactical laundry list.
However, tactics are not about a laundry list of do’s and
don’ts. Tactics are fundamentally a way
of conducting business that puts your opponent into a recognizable disadvantage
from which he is unable to survive (whether that means he is defeated/killed/injured/taken
into custody, etc., he is unable to continue his present course of action
against you).
Sound tactics are essentially a physical manifestation of Applied OODA
Theory©. OODA theory to gain a decisive edge in the time competitive environment of
combatives at any level generally focuses on the ability to orient
quickly to
any threat, enabling you to respond in a manner that is confusing and
disorienting to the Threat. Applied OODA
Theory© requires orienting early to threatening behavior and
circumstances
early enough to gain a decisive tactical and physical edge over the
Threat. Primarily it concerns two
different OODA Cycles to permit the officer to “get inside the Threat’s
OODA
Loop,” get them into a “Goofy Loop” (the “O-O Bounce”) and keep him
there :
► Threat cue: Threat cues are based on orienting to the
suspect’s behavior and orienting that behavior to the laws and policies
governing your force response.
o Threat
cues require the full O-O-D-A Cycle and further orientation before
action can
be taken.
o When
force is not reasonable given the present orientation (perception), the
cycle
will resemble a continuing cycle of O-O-D-->O…
(Observe-Orient-DecideàObserve…).
o As
soon as it is oriented that the suspect has become a “threat,” the full
O-O-DàA
sequence is employed.
► Trip-Wire: A trip-wire response is a “go/no-go”
decision. Based on suspect behavior, and
upon orienting to the threat, you act as soon as that trip-wire
threshold is
met. It requires no thought about “why?”
or “If I’m allowed to…” Based on his
actions, you respond per training.
o Trip-wires
shortcut the decision-making cycle. Upon
orientation, the action is taken.
o O-O-->A
(Observation-OrientationàAction)
sequences continue until there is a need to
determine an action based on continuing threat cues (whereupon the full O-O-D-->A cycle sequence will initiate based on threat cues).
Tactics are essentially an application of "Applied OODA Theory"© consisting of the
three foundational principles of tactics:
-
Angles
- Proxemics.
- Relative capabilities of the combatants,
equipment, and their weapons.
#1. ANGLES
Angles are primarily “angles of attack.” It is the direction and angle by which one is
attacked. Whether that is through
trajectory (the parabolic flight of a missile—bullet or otherwise—through the
air) or a fist, vehicle, sword, stick, explosive, air delivered munitions—whatever
the mechanism to injure employed—there is an angle of attack that must be
identified and protected against to increase your safety.
All angles of threat have a direction. It may be from the gunman five feet away, a
man with a shotgun 20 yards away, that sniper 800 meters away in an elevated
position, or mortar fire. Traditionally
it has been called a kill-zone. A
kill-zone can be defined as any area permitting the intersection of a weapon or
missile (and its effects) with its target.
If you get shot, you were in a kill-zone. If you suffer the effects of an explosion,
you were in a kill-zone. The same if you
are kicked in the shins or knifed through the ribs. All result from a directional component, or
angle of attack. Identifying and
avoiding the kill-zone created by the angle as determined by the proxemics is
key to preventing injury while creating injury (or threat of injury) to the
opponent.
#2. PROXEMICS
Proxemics is the relationship of bodies in space
and geography. The combatants’ position
relative to the other becomes a threat or not based on their weapon’s
capabilities, e.g., a man armed with a knife at 50 yards is not a serious
immediate threat, whereas a man with a shotgun or rifle likely is. A man with a scoped rifle who is 40 feet
higher than his target is important information in determining either how to
shoot the target or in not getting shot, depending on which side of the muzzle
one finds himself. Determining the position
of an opponent prior to a shot being fired, explosive being detonated, or a
kick beginning or the knife striking provides valuable intelligence that
permits you to avoid the kill zone, negating—or, at least, mitigating—the
weapons’ capability to harm you.The same goes when selecting an area or place in
which to confront an opponent. Your
position can give you an advantage over your opponent. Selecting a favorable site or creating a
circumstance for the confrontation greatly influences the outcome. Understanding the advantages and
disadvantages inherent in proxemics provides a foundational opportunity to
create or eliminate angles of attack based on your present needs.
#3. CAPABILITIES OF THE COMBATANTS, THEIR EQUIPMENT
AND WEAPONS, ETC.
A core component to Tactics is the capabilities each
of the combatants brings to the fight. How
these capabilities match up can be a deciding factor in the victory. This includes:
The willingness to do what it takes to win. The desire to win, the ruthlessness which one
enters into violence, the willingness to harm another, and the relentlessness
of never quitting despite overwhelming odds, injury, and fatigue cannot be
measured. This is the single most
important component in capabilities.
Attributes.
This not only includes that which is God-given in terms of size, natural
strength, reflexes, eye sight (especially the all-important peripheral vision),
hand-to-eye coordination, etc., but also those attributes that have been
enhanced through strength and fitness training.
Size matters in a hand-to-hand fight—given equal training, athleticism,
and skills, the larger, heavier fighter will likely win.
Skills. These
are the fighting skills each possesses.
CQB, CQD, Defensive Tactics, running the gun, ability to hit what is
needed to be hit on-time, in-time are all important components in determining
the outcome of the conflict. Higher skill
development often gives an unbeatable edge to the better trained combatant.
Experience. Combat experience, whether in full-fledged
military-style combat, police gunfights, in the ring, or in street fights gives
the more experienced combatant the edge because he has been better inoculated
to the stress of fighting. Like a novice
skydiver that remembers almost nothing of his first jump but becomes more and
more clear after a dozen jumps, the highly experienced fighter knows when to
move and where to go to survive. The
German Air Force in World War I discovered that a pilot who survived three
dogfights would likely go on to be an ace—however, the greatest losses of
pilots were those considered to be inexperienced.
Disparity of Weaponry. The disparity in weapons each employs carries
a great deal of weight in the outcome.
The saying from the Old West that “God made man, but Sam Colt made them
all equal” is true. The best empty hand
fighter in the world against a competent shooter armed with a semiautomatic rifle
at 20 yards has almost no chance of survival.
While a man can win a gunfight armed with a
handgun against an opponent armed with a shotgun or rifle, generally a firearm
against a knife wins (unless the man with the knife can get inside the muzzle
of the firearm, turning the firearm’s strength into weakness due to the relative
capabilities of both the knife and the firearm). The capability to penetrate cover renders a
good position fatal. A rifle against a
tank, or a tank against an armed jet aircraft carries a disparity of
effectiveness that renders the ability to survive unlikely.
Numbers.
The greater the number of personnel one has available to respond to
aggression or threat, the more likely the outcome will be affected in favor of
the side with the most people. A lone
operator against a dozen armed men at close range will likely be at a huge
disadvantage.
Equipment.
Ballistic armor and vests, radio communication, optical sights, night
vision or infrared capabilities, air assets, armored vehicles, etc., increase
your capabilities to defend or detect your opponent. These can also be employed by the Threat to
your detriment. The quality and relative
capabilities of the involved-parties’ equipment is a real factor in the outcome
of any conflict.
Relative capabilities. It is the relative capabilities of the
opponents that creates opportunities for victory or defeat. A bigger, stronger fighter will want to use
those positive attributes against a smaller, weaker opponent. That weaker fighter will hope to use
attributes of mobility and hit and run against the stronger opponent to wear
him down and injure him sufficiently to create a win. A sniper in an elevated position at 600 yards
hidden by dense undergrowth with a clear field of fire can paralyze 100
soldiers who cannot see him and are shot if they move. The highly trained can often overcome superior,
seemingly overwhelming numbers.
All fights will involve the capabilities of each
opponent relative to the other. Each
attempts to bring his strengths to bear against the weaknesses of the
other.
CONCLUSION
Before getting into either the study or the application of specific tactical solutions,
understanding the core foundations of “Tactics” is helpful. The core elements of tactics are an
amalgamation of three components: angles
and proxemics, applied OODA theory, and the relative capabilities each brings
to the fight. Angles of attack, or how
you deliver force or avoid being the recipient of some type of force mechanism
is primary to tactics. Angles are
determined by the proxemics of the combatants, or where each is in space
relative to the other. Positioning
should be conscious, placing your opponent at a disadvantage (he is downhill,
has the light in his eyes, he cannot see you, etc.) that is eventually
recognizable to him.
By intentionally employing the concepts of
Applied OODA Theory©, you are able to deceive him regarding your true
intentions. This deception creates
confusion, delaying his ability to understand what is happening. As confusion increases, fatigue and injuries
take a dramatic toll on his ability to continue effectively struggling. Soon, he fails and is defeated.
The relative capabilities of the opponents are a
determining factor in the outcome. Being
a bigger, stronger, more athletic and experience fighter against someone
smaller and less experienced is an advantage.
Bringing a bow and arrow to a fight against an unarmed man at distance
is a positive capability. It turns into
a disability against a man armed with a repeating shotgun. That repeating shotgun is less useful at 300
yards against a semiautomatic rifle. A
scoped rifle will likely be an asset at 800 yards against the semiautomatic
rifle with iron sights. A man with night
vision capabilities armed with a handgun against that scoped rifle in conditions
of extreme darkness may have the advantage.
Ten guys shooting at a single man have an advantage. Most capabilities are inadequate against an
artillery round landing within a few feet of the shooter. A nuclear weapon tops them all.
All capabilities in a fight are relative. Capabilities must be matched to the
situation. Those with lesser
capabilities must create an advantage through Applied OODA Theory© to distract
and confuse the Threat. When confusion
reigns, even the most sophisticated fighter is paralyzed.
Tactics is an uncomplicated concept that has
been made complicated. Uncomplicating it
is process of understanding what the components are and applying them in-time,
on-time to make a difference.